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TEN YEARS AFTER: A RECONSIDERATION 

OF THE CODIFICATION OF EVIDENCE 

LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS 

JEREMIAH F. HEALY III· 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 30, 1982, by a divided vote, the Justices of the Mas­
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected a codification of evidence 
law for Massachusetts. 1 That rejection of the Proposed Massachusetts 
* A.B., Rutgers College; J.D., Harvard Law School; Professor of Law, New Eng­
land School of Law. The author wishes to thank the men and women who made this 
sabbatical project possible, including the Honorable James R. Lawton, Chairman of the 
Board of Trustees of the New England School of Law; Dean John F. O'Brien, Dean of the 
law school; my colleagues, on the faculty and elsewhere, who contributed valuable com­
ments on earlier drafts of this Article; and Barry Steams, Reference Librarian of the law 
school, for his invaluable help in locating documents which supported this effort. 
1. Announcement Concerning The Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence (SJC­
2787, Dec. 30, 1982) [hereinafter SJC Announcement], reprinted in KENNETH B. HUGHES, 
MASSACHUSETfS PRACTICE app. I at 508 (William G. Young et al. eels., Supp. 1992). 
Since the action of the Supreme Judicial Court was by way of announcement rather than 
reported decision, the text of the court's explanation for rejecting the proposal is neither in 
the Massachusetts nor North Eastern Reporter systems and accordingly is difficult to ac­
cess easily. For ease of reference in using this Article, the following is the entire text of the 
SJC Announcement: 
On November 22, 1976 the Supreme Judicial Court, upon the request of the 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and of the Presidents of the Massachu­
setts and Boston Bar Associations, appointed an advisory committee to consider 
whether the Massachusetts rules of evidence should be codified or promulgated. 
In July of 1980 the advisory committee transmitted proposed Rules of Evidence 
to the [c]ourt. 
The Justices received briefs and comment from numerous parties and bar 
associations concerning the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence. Oral ar­
guments were heard on September 9, 1982. The Justices express their apprecia­
tion for the efforts of the advisory committee and the Reporters who worked on 
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Rules of Evidence2 left the commonwealth a "common-law" evidence 
state with many statutory accretions and adjustments. Since that re­
jection, at least two important events have occurred. First, both state 
and federal courts have cited, discussed, and occasionally adopted in­
dividual portions of the proposed Massachusetts rules. 3 Second, a 
these Proposed Rules, as well as to the various parties who have submitted their 
comments and briefs. The Justices have given careful consideration to the views 
expressed. 
The Justices recognize that if the Proposed Rules were to be adopted, (1) 
there would have to be careful coordination with the Legislature to repeal, revise, 
or modify many statutes which deal with the admissibility and effect of evidence; 
(2) many of the Proposed Rules involve departures from the principles set forth in 
the Federal Rules of Evidence; and (3) some of the Proposed Rules are subject to 
significant and arguably valid criticisms . 
. A majority of the Justices conclude that promulgation of rules of evidence 
would tend to restrict the development of common-law principles pertaining to 
the admissibility of evidence. The valid objective of uniformity of practice in Fed­
eral and State courts would not necessarily be advanced because the Proposed 
Rules, in their present form, depart significantly from the Federal Rules of Evi­
dence. Additionally, in the view of some of the Justices of [sic] the Federal Rules 
of Evidence have not led to uniform practice in the various Federal courts and 
are, in some instances, less well adapted to the needs of modem trial practice than 
current Massachusetts law. Accordingly, a majority of the Justices have con­
cluded that it would not be advisable to adopt the Proposed Massachusetts Rules 
of Evidence at the present time. The Proposed Rules have substantial value as a 
comparative standard in the continued and historic role of the courts in develop­
ing principles of law relating to evidence. Parties are invited to cite the Proposed 
Rules, wherever appropriate, in briefs and memoranda submitted. 
Id. at 508-09. 
2. Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence [hereinafter cited as Prop. Mass. R. 
Evid.], reprinted in 8 MASS. LAW. WKLY. 1231 (1980) (note corrections made at 8 MASS. 
LAW. WKLY. 1289 (1980», and in JOHN J. McNAUGHT & J. HAROLD FLANNERY, MAS­
SACHUSETTS EVIDENCE: A COURTROOM REFERENCE (1988 & Supp. 1992). Unfortu­
nately, the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence themselves were never published in 
the typical reporters. The full text of the proposed rules was set forth in the Massachusetts 
Lawyers Weekly. An accessible current source for the rules is McNAUGHT & FLANNERY, 
supra. That looseleaf volume, published by MCLE, Inc., contains the SJC Announcement 
and the proposed rules with advisory committee notes. Id. at A-I to A-86. The authors 
conveniently include citations, categorized by specific rule number, to the proposed rules in 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and (intermediate) Massachusetts Appeals Court 
opinions. Id. at B-1 to B-lO. 
Another source for the proposed rules is KENNETH B. HUGHES, MASSACHUSETTS 
PRACTICE (William G. Young et al. eds., Supp. 1992). In the 1992 supplement, new edi­
tors William G. Young, John R. Pollets, and Christopher Poreda provide the SJC An­
nouncement and the proposed rules with advisory committee notes. Id. at 508-90. Those 
editors also try to organize (under the heading "Massachusetts Evidentiary Standards") the 
common-law and statutory evidence precepts of the commonwealth using the organiza­
tional format of the Federal and Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence. Id. at 1-95. 
Another source that uses the proposed rules is PAUL J. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MAS­
SACHUSETTS EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1981 & Supp. 1985). Chief Justice Liacos refers to the 
proposed rules in his main text discussion of common-law and statutory evidence precepts. 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 98-233. 
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great many more jurisdictions have adopted a "code" form of evi­
dence.4 In addition, current litigation conditions suggest that a codi­
fied system of evidence would advance the cause of justice in all 
Massachusetts forums. S 
Accordingly, in this tenth anniversary year of the rejection of the 
proposed Massachusetts rules, a reconsideration of the codification ef­
fort and process is appropriate. Part I of this Article will recount the 
history of the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence project. 
Part II of this Article will chronicle the experience of Massachusetts 
courts in using the proposed rules since their rejection. Part III will 
review codification movements in other states since 1982. Part IV will 
explore reasons why codification would improve the administration of 
justice in the courts of the commonwealth. Part V of this Article will 
identify some remaining issues regarding codification. 
I. 	 THE PROPOSED MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF EVIDENCE 
PROJECT 
On November 22, 1976, the Supreme Judicial Court appointed an 
advisory committee to consider whether the evidence law of the com­
monwealth should be codified.6 The appointment was made at the 
request of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and of the Presi­
dents of the Massachusetts and Boston Bar Associations.7 The court 
also may have been influenced by the impact of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, which became effective the previous year. 8 
The original chairman of the committee was a Massachusetts Su­
perior Court judge, the Honorable A. David Mazzone.9 Upon Judge 
Mazzone's elevation to the federal bench, the Honorable John E. Fen­
ton, Jr., then a member of the Massachusetts Land Court (and now 
the Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court Department), suc­
4. See infra text accompanying notes 234-313. 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 314-432. 
6. SJC Announcement, supra note 1. 
7. Id. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws amended the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence in 1974 to parallel the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. UNIF. R. EVID. 
(1974). 
8. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified at 28 U.S.C. app. 733 (1988». 
A comprehensive discussion of the federal codified rules and the Massachusetts common­
law system appeared in 1975 as well. See James M. Hughes et aI., Comparison of the New 
Federal Rules ofEvidence and Rules ofEvidence Applied in Massachusetts Courts, 60 MASS. 
L.Q. 125 (1975). 
9. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE PROPOSED MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF EVI­
DENCE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (1980) [hereinafter ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE HISTORY], reprinted in HUGHES, supra note I, at 509. 
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ceeded him.1O The original reporter of the committee was Professor 
Richard H. Field, professor emeritus at Harvard Law Schoo1. 11 Upon 
Professor Field's untimely death, Professor Charles M. Bumim of Suf­
folk University Law School succeeded him.12 
Under Judge Fenton and Professor Bumim, the advisory commit­
tee l3 reported on its work and conducted a forum at the annual meet­
ing of the Massachusetts Bar Association in June, 1978, where it 
received comment on its draft set of rules. 14 In July, 1980, the com­
mittee submitted to the court a set of rules based mainly upon the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and partly upon the Proposed Federal 
Rules of Evidence (as suggested by the United States Supreme Court 
but not enacted by Congress), IS the Uniform Rules of Evidence and 
other codifications. 16 The full text of the Proposed Massachusetts 
Rules of Evidence and advisory committee's notes were published in 
the Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly shortly thereafter,l7 
An exhaustive analysis of the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of 
Evidence themselves is beyond the scope of this Article. ls However, 
some discussion of the proposed Massachusetts rules is essential to an 
understanding of the court's later declination of the rules. 
Initially, the advisory committee "adopted as a working policy 
the acceptance of [a] federal rule [of evidence] as a starting point, with 
a departure from the federal rule to be made only when reasons of 
policy or of well-established Massachusetts practice dictated other­
wise."19 As a result, there were many proposed Massachusetts rules 
that were identical to their federal counterparts and which either 
10. Id. Judge Mazzone continued to serve the committee as a consultant even after 
he moved to the federal court. SJC Rejects Evidence Code, 11 MASS. LAW. WKLY. 457 
(1983). 
11. ADVISORY COMMITIEE HISTORY, supra note 9, at first page (unnumbered). 
12. Id. 
13. The other members of the advisory committee were the Honorable Lawrence D. 
Shubow, Vice Chairman; Attorneys Richard W. Renehan, Secretary, Richard D. Gelinas, 
and John F. Keenan; Senator Alan D. Sisitsky; and Professor Stephen N. Subrin of North­
eastern University School of Law. 
14. ADVISORY COMMITIEE HISTORY, supra note 9, at second page (unnumbered). 
IS. See infra text accompanying notes 250-67. 
16. Assembling the proposed Massachusetts rules was an exhausting task, as chroni­
cled by the committee. ADVISORY COMMITIEE HISTORY, supra note 9, at second through 
fourth pages (unnumbered). 
17. See supra note 2. 
18. The arguments in the brief of the Boston Bar Association alone ran for 70 pages. 
See generally, Brief for the Boston Bar Association, In re Proposed Mass. Rules of Evi­
dence (1982) [hereinafter BBA Brief]. Again, references to the proposed rules are con­
tained in the analyses of their common-law counterparts in LIACOS, supra note 2. 
19. ADVISORY COMMITIEE HISTORY, supra note 9, at first page (unnumbered). 
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would not have changed existing Massachusetts evidence law20 or 
would have changed existing law for the better. However, as the com­
mittee reviewed its efforts, it became persuaded that "at times ... the 
... federal rule, examined in the light of developing case law, was not 
necessarily sound."21 As a result, there were many situations in which 
the advisory committee departed significantly from federal counter­
parts. Some examples of these departures, traced article by article 
through the proposed rules, demonstrate this point. 
Article I ("General Provisions") and Article II ("Judicial No­
tice") closely parallel the actual federal rules.22 However, Article III 
("Presumptions") is radically different from its federal counterpart. 
In Federal Rule 301, the effect of a presumption is merely to shift the 
burden of production of the presumed fact to the party not carrying 
the burden of persuasion.23 Proposed Massachusetts Rule 301, how­
ever, shifts the burden ofpersuasion on the presumed fact to the party 
opposing the presumption.24 As well as effecting a substantial change 
in Massachusetts law,25 the change would cause a significant impact in 
those federal court cases where the state rule would be "borrowed. "26 
20. BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 4-5. 
21. ADVISORY CoMMITTEE HISTORY, supra note 9, at second page (unnumbered). 
22. Proposed Rule 101 ("Scope [of the Rules]") was modified to fit a state court 
context. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 101 advisory committee's note, supra note 2. Proposed 
Massachusetts Rule 104 ("Preliminary Questions") contained two departures from the fed­
eral rule. First, part "(a)" was modified with respect to findings by the trial judge on the 
existence of a conspiracy and on motions to suppress evidence. Second, a new subdivision 
"(f)" was added with respect to criminal defendants contesting dying declarations and con­
fessions. See BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 9. 
23. FED. R. EVID. 301. This is the so-called "Thayer view" or "bursting-bubble 
view" of a presumption. For the evolution of FED. R. EVID. 301, see infra text accompa­
nying notes 259-63. 
24. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 301(a), supra note 2. This is the so-called "Morgan view" 
of presumptions and was the thrust of the original proposed version of Federal Rule 301 as 
submitted by the United States Supreme Court to Congress, but rejected by the federal 
legislature in favor of Federal Rule 301 as enacted. See FED. R. EVID. 301 advisory com­
mittee's note; Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District 
Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 336 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 Proposed Federal 
Rules]; Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District 
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 207 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Proposed Federal 
Rules]. 
25. See BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 11-15. 
26. Federal Rule 302 provides that "[i]n civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a 
presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to which state 
law supplies the rule of decision is determined in accordance with state law." FED. R. 
EVID. 302. While, typically, Federal Rule 302 applies in diversity of citizenship claims 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988), the federal court will also look to state presumption law in 
what used to be called "pendent" or "ancillary" claims and what are now known as "sup­
plemental subject matter jurisdiction" claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 1990). See 
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The proposed Massachusetts rule also departed from the Federal 
Rules of Evidence in providing for "prima facie evidence"27 and pre­
sumptions in criminal cases.28 
Proposed Article IV ("Relevancy and Its Limits") was relatively 
faithful to the then-existing29 Federal Rules of Evidence. Proposed 
Massachusetts Rule 404 ("Character Evidence") omitted the subpara­
graph permitting a criminal defendant (and the prosecutor in rebuttal) 
to offer evidence of the pertinent character trait of the victim of a 
crime. 30 Proposed Massachusetts Rule 406 ("Habit: Routine Prac­
tice") was somewhat more restrictive of habit and routine practice 
evidence than its federal counterpart.31 However, Proposed Massa­
chusetts Rule 408 ("Compromise and Offers to Compromise") was 
somewhat more protective of settlement offers than its federal counter­
part.32 Proposed Massachusetts Rule 410 adopted the 1975 version, 
rather than the 1979 version, of Federal Rule 410.33 Finally, with re­
spect to Article IV, the advisory committee did not provide for a sepa­
rate rule of evidence to parallel Federal Rule 412 concerning rape 
victims.34 
The most troubling aspect of the proposed Massachusetts rules 
generally, Arthur D. Wolf, Codification 0/Supplemental Jurisdiction: Anatomy ofa Legis­
lative Proposal, 14 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1992). 
27. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 301(b), supra note 2. 
28. Id. at Rule 302. 
29. Federal Rule 404(b) was recently amended to require the proponent of prior bad 
acts evidence to give notice to an opponent in advance of trial of the proponent's intention 
to offer evidence of other bad acts for one of the purposes permitted under subparagraph 
"(b)". FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (effective Dec. 1, 1991). 
30. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 404(a), supra note 2. Apparently, the advisory committee 
was concerned that, beyond the rape-victim protections provided for in MASS. GEN. L. ch. 
233, § 21B (1990), and self-defense considerations developed through the common law, the 
victim subparagraph in Proposed Rule 404(a) would inappropriately expand admissible 
evidence in a criminal case. See Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 404 advisory committee's note, 
supra note 2; BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 19. 
31. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 406, supra note 2. Proposed Rule 406(a) would exclude 
habit or routine practice evidence on the issue of negligence, and Proposed Rule 406(b) 
would require habit or routine practice to be proved by numerous specific instances of 
conduct (as opposed to reputation or opinion evidence). See BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 
21-22. For a discussion of the committee's reasons for the restrictions, see Prop. Mass. R. 
Evid. 406 advisory committee's note, supra note 2. 
32. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 408, supra note 2. Proposed Rule 408 contained language 
to protect offerors of settlement who were co-defendants, third-party defendants, and even 
non-parties to the lawsuit. See BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 23. 
33. See BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 24. FED. R. EVID. 410 (amended by Pub. L. 
No. 96-42, 93 Stat. 326 (1979) (effective Dec. 1, 1980». 
34. This omission was probably because of existing Massachusetts statutory law on 
the admissibility of the past sexual behavior of an alleged rape victim. See MASS. GEN. L. 
ch. 233, § 21B (1990). 
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involved Article V ("Privileges"). In fairness, the advisory committee 
was in a no-win situation with respect to codifying privileges. On the 
one hand, the detailed codification of the federal rules regarding privi­
lege submitted to Congress by the Supreme Court35 had been rejected 
by Congress in favor of a single provision, telling the federal courts to 
develop privilege in a common-law manner and to look to state privi­
lege law where directed.36 Thus, the Massachusetts advisory commit­
tee had no authoritative federal rules to copy. On the other hand, the 
Supreme Judicial Court has always been very deferential to the Massa­
chusetts legislature on the recognition of privileges.37 Caught in this 
dilemma, the advisory committee endeavored to structure codified 
privilege rules for Massachusetts drawn substantially from the Pro­
posed Federal Rules of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evi­
dence.38 In so doing, the committee basically adopted the restrictive 
wording of Proposed Federal Rule 501 and Uniform Rule 501, and 
deleted Proposed Federal Rule 502 as redundant.39 The committee 
then proceeded to respect certain existing Massachusetts statutory 
privileges and to challenge others.40 
Regarding the individual proposed rules on privilege, Proposed 
Massachusetts Rule 502 ("Lawyer-Client Privilege") chose as its defi­
nition for "representative of the client" the restrictive "control-group" 
test.41 The committee suggested that this provision might be the most 
controversial within the proposed rule,42 mainly because the provision 
was taken from the uniform rule model,43 and no such definition was 
contained in the proposed federal rule.44 More significantly, within a 
35. See 1972 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 24, at 413-46 (Rules 501-06). 
36. See FED. R. EVID. 501. See infra text accompanying notes 264-67 for a discus­
sion of the evolution of Federal Rule 501. 
37. See, e.g., Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1983) (de­
ferring to the legislature on the issue of a parent-child privilege), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 
(1984). 
38. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 501 advisory committee's note, supra note 2. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at Rule 502(a)(2) advisory committee's note. The control-group test extends 
the circle of confidentiality between lawyer and client to those persons who have "authority 
to obtain professional legal services or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf 
of the client." Id. at Rule 502(a)(2). See also City of Philadelphia V. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962), mandamus and prohibition denied sub. nom 
General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 
(1963). 
42. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 502(a)(2) advisory committee's note, supra note 2. 
43. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(a)(2) (1974). 
44. Proposed Federal Rule 503 contained no definition of "representative of a client" 
because the federal advisory committee preferred to leave that definition, somewhat disin­
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year, the United States Supreme Court would reject the control-group 
test definition of "representative of a client" as too restrictive for the 
attorney-client relationship.45 Somewhat overlooked in the contro­
versy were the positive changes the proposed Massachusetts rules 
would have brought to the attorney-client relationship in the common­
wealth, such as broadening the definition of "client" to include organi­
zations as well as natural persons,46 broadening the definition of 
"lawyer" to include those a client reasonably believes to be licensed to 
practice,47 and broadening the definition of "confidential" to include 
within the privilege those communications that the client intended to 
remain confidential even if an eavesdropper overheard them.48 
Unfortunately, other privileges proposed for codification were 
also controversial. Proposed Massachusetts Rule 503 ("Psychothera­
pist-Patient Privilege") challenged the existing statutory privilege49 in 
numerous respects, with the advisory committee implicitly calling for 
the repeal of that statute. 50 Proposed Massachusetts Rule 504 ("Hus­
band-Wife Testimonial Privilege and Disqualification") would have 
slightly expanded the beneficial and traditional privilege regarding un­
favorable testimony in a criminal case, with the witness-spouse being 
genuously, to "common-law development." See 1972 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 
24, at 361-62 (Rule 503 and advisory committee's note). 
45. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). As a result of the Upjohn 
decision, the National Conference amended the Uniform Rule to conform to the Supreme 
Court's standards in Upjohn. See UNIF. R. EVID. 502(a)(2) (1986). 
46. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 502(a)(I), supra note 2. 
47. Id. at Rule 502(a)(3). This is particularly important in light of the inconsistency 
of the Supreme Judicial Court in interpreting definitions within statutory privileges. For 
example, in Commonwealth v. Collett, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Mass. 1982), the court 
expansively defined "persons consulting" a social worker within the social worker privilege. 
See generally MASS. GEN. L. ch. 112, § l35A (1990). However, in Commonwealth v. Man­
deville, 436 N.E.2d 912, 922 (Mass. 1982), the court narrowly defined "psychotherapist" 
within the patient-psychotherapist privilege. See generally MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 20B 
(1990). Interestingly, the court in Mandeville included a footnote conceding that "Rule 
503(a) of the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence might well produce a different 
result in this case." Mandeville, 436 N.E.2d at 923 n.ll. See a/so Collett, 439 N.E.2d at 
1229 n.4. See generally Jeremiah F. Healy III, Case & Statute Comments: Evidence­
Privileges-Psychotherapist-Reporter-Socia/ Worker, 68 MASS. L. REV. 83 (1983). 
48. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 502(a)(5), (b), supra note 2 ("A client has a privilege to ... 
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications."). 
49. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 20B (1990). 
50. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 503 advisory committee's note, supra note 2. The commit­
tee also included the following in its Advisory Committee History: "The members [of the 
committee] working on Article V spent endless hours attempting to draft a working rule 
which would accommodate the existing Massachusetts statutes on the psychotherapist and 
social worker privileges, a task compounded by a belief that the existing statutes created 
more problems than they solved." ADVISORY COMMITTEE HISTORY, supra note 9, at sec­
ond page (unnumbered). 
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the holder of the privilege.51 However, Proposed Massachusetts Rule 
504 also would have perpetuated the oft-criticized disqualification of 
husband and wife as competent witnesses to testify to their "private 
conversations"52 and would have expanded that disqualification to 
"confidential communications. "53 While many of the other departures 
in the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence from the Proposed 
Federal Rules of Evidence on privilege may have been justifiable, 54 
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 512 ("Comment Upon or Inference 
from Claim of Privilege in Criminal Cases") would have prohibited 
comment upon the claim of a privilege only in criminal cases,55 not in 
both criminal and civil cases as provided for in its Proposed Federal 
and Uniform Rule counterparts. 56 
Article VI ("Witnesses") for the most part tracked the actual 
Federal Rules of Evidence. One striking exception was Proposed 
Massachusetts Rule 609 ("Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of 
Crime"), which followed neither the actual federal counterpart 57 nor 
the existing Massachusetts statute58 on impeachment by criminal con­
viction. A second striking exception was Proposed Massachusetts 
Rule 611 ("Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation"), 
which departed from its federal counterpart in retaining the "wide­
open" or "Massachusetts Rule" regarding scope of cross-examina­
tion.59 A third, but less striking, exception was Proposed Massachu­
51. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 504(a)(I) & advisory committee's note, supra note 2. 
Under the proposed federal rule, the defendant-spouse would have been the holder of this 
privilege. 1972 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 24, at 369 (Rule 505(a». Under Fed­
eral Rule 501, the witness-spouse is the holder of this privilege. Trammel v. United States, 
445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). 
52. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 20 (1990). 
53. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 504(b), supra note 2. Thus, as a rule of disqualification 
rather than privilege, a husband and wife would have been incompetent to testify as to a 
confidential communication between them-oral, telephonic, or written-even if both 
spouses wanted the communication revealed in court. Gallagher v. Goldstein, 524 N.E.2d 
53, 54 (Mass. 1988). 
54. See, e.g., Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 503, supra note 2 ("Religious Privilege") (broad­
ening the narrow, statutory "priest-penitent" theological base of MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, 
§ 20A (1990), to equalize adherents and clergy within many recognized religions). 
55. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 512, supra note 2. 
56. 1972 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 24, at 382 (Rule 513); UNIF. R. EVID. 
512. 
57. FED. R. EVID. 609. It should be noted that Federal Rule 609(a) was amended in 
January, 1990, to more clearly allocate the burdens of parties and the task of the trial judge 
in considering convictions for impeachment purposes. Amendments to Federal Rules of 
Evidence-Rule 609 129 F.R.D. 347, 347-55 (1990). 
58. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 21 (1990). 
59. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 611(b), supra note 2. Proposed Massachusetts Rule 611(b) 
provides that "[a] witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the 
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setts Rule 612 ("Writing or Object Used to Refresh Memory"), which 
purportedly maintained the substance of the federal rule while merely 
changing the federal rule's format. 60 
In Article VII ("Opinions and Expert Testimony"), the advisory 
committee adhered to the federal rules language,61 including Proposed 
Massachusetts Rule 703 ("Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts"), 
which permits an expert witness to rely upon facts not admitted (and, 
indeed, not admissible) into evidence in forming an expert opinion.62 
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 706 ("Court Appointed Experts") dif­
fered from its federal counterpart by expressly denying the trial judge 
discretion to disclose to the jury the fact that a given expert had been 
appointed by the court.63 
Article VIII ("Hearsay") contained relatively few differences 
from the federal rules despite the difficulty of the subject. 64 Proposed 
Massachusetts Rule 801 ("Definitions") was identical to the federal 
rule. 6S Proposed Massachusetts Rule 802 ("The Hearsay Rule") was 
similar to the federal rule in that it recognized the possibility of hear­
say exceptions outside the four corners of the rules codification. Un­
fortunately, the advisory committee did not comprehensively list the 
existing outside exceptions in the same manner as the federal rule.66 
Departures from the Federal Rules of Evidence did crop up in the 
hearsay exceptions gathered under Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803 
("Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial") and 
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 804 ("Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant 
case, including credibility. In the interests ofjustice, the judge may limit cross-examination 
with respect to matters not testified to on direct examination." Id. This is the mirror 
image of Federal Rule 61 I (b), which permits cross-examination on matters not testified to 
on direct examination only at the discretion of the judge. See FED. R. EVID. 611(b). 
60. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 612, supra note 2. But see the criticism of this "format". 
change as affecting substantive discretion of the trial judge in BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 
47. 
61. It should be noted that Federal Rule 704 was amended in 1984 to split the rule 
into subsections "(a)" and "(b)", and to include in Rule 704(b) a restriction against ulti­
mate issue testimony in certain criminal cases having to do with mental condition, as a 
response to the litigation over John Hinckley'S attempt to assassinate then-President Ron­
ald Reagan in 1981. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
2067. 
62. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 703, supra note 2; FED. R. EVID. 703. See infra text ac­
companying notes 187-200 for a discussion of Proposed Massachusetts Rule 703. 
63. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 706, supra note 2. See the criticism of this departure from 
the federal rule in BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 51-52. 
64. See generally Gilda M. Tuoni, Hearsay-Its Application in Massachusetts and 
Federal Courts, 73 MASS. L. REV. 100 (1988). 
65. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 801, supra note 2; FED. R. EVID. 801. 
66. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 802, supra note 2; see FED. R. EVID. 802 advisory commit­
tee's note. 
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Unavailable"). For the most part, these variations were trivia1.67 
Some significant departures should be noted, however. 
In Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803(1) ("Present Sense Impres­
sion"), the committee included language (not contained in the federal 
rule) that would permit a trial judge to exclude an otherwise qualify­
ing hearsay statement when such statement is made under circum­
stances indicating untrustworthiness.68 In Proposed Massachusetts 
Rule 803(18) ("Learned Treatises"), the committee deleted language 
(contained in the federal rule) that would have permitted the use of 
learned treatises on direct examination of an expert.69 Finally, the 
committee deleted from the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evi­
dence the residual or "catch-all" exception found in Federal Rule 
803(24) ("Other Exceptions"). 70 
The advisory committee also departed from the federal rules in 
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 804. In Proposed Rule 804(a) ("Defini­
tion of Unavailability"), the committee deleted certain parenthetical 
preconditions to eligibility for the hearsay exceptions under Proposed 
Rule 804(b).71 Under Proposed Massachusetts Rule 804(b)(5), the 
committee again deleted the sister residual exception, which is found 
in the federal rule, and replaced that residual exception with language 
incorporating a statutory hearsay exception for certain declarations of 
a deceased person. 72 
In Article IX ("Authentication and Identification") of the Pro­
posed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence, the advisory committee 
67. See, for example, the deletion of Federal Rule 803(15) ("Statements in Docu­
ments Affecting an Interest in Property") on the ground that "[t]rustworthiness [of such 
statements] is considered insufficient and the need for such an exception is marginal." 
Although the committee deleted this exception, it reserved the slot for the rule. Prop. 
Mass. R. Evid. 803(15) advisory committee's note, supra note 2 ("Reserved"). 
68. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 803(1), supra note 2. The advisory committee believed this 
modification was justified by "[c]oncems of reliability of statements potentially admissible 
under the federal formulation." Id. at Rule 803(1) advisory committee's note. 
69. Id. at Rule 803(18). This deletion was strongly criticized on efficiency grounds 
in the BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 58-59. See infra note 173 for a discussion of the recent 
adoption of Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803(18) by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
70. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 803(24), supra note 2 ("Reserved"). This deletion by the 
committee was also strongly criticized, on consistency and judicial administration grounds, 
in the BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 60-61. 
71. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 804(a), supra note 2. The precondition required the propo­
nent of a hearsay statement under certain hearsay exceptions in part "(b)" to depose or 
otherwise obtain the past testimony of a declarant, who by the time of trial has become 
unavailable. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a). 
72. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 804(b)(5), supra note 2. Again, this deletion and substitu­
tion was criticized (on consistency, judicial administration and redundancy grounds) in the 
BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 63. 
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tracked the corresponding federal rules closely, making internal 
changes only to reflect the different governmental labels applicable to 
agencies at the state level. 73 The committee did add to Proposed Mas­
sachusetts Rule 902 ("Self-authentication") a subparagraph, not found 
in the federal rule, for hospital and other medical records.74 Addition­
ally, the committee drafted Proposed Massachusetts Rule 903 ("Sub­
scribing Witness' Testimony Unnecessary") to reflect concerns 
exclusive to the state, which were more narrow than those behind the 
federal counterpart.7S The advisory committee tracked exactly the 
federal rule language for all of Article X ("Contents of Writings, Re­
cordings and Photographs"), which deals with the concerns of the 
"Best Evidence Rule."76 Drawing from the Uniform Rules of Evi­
dence, the committee, in Article XI ("Miscellaneous Rules"), pro­
vided for the general applicability of the code in the courts of the 
commonwealth,77 exceptions to the code's applicability in certain pro­
ceedings,78 and a citable title for the code. 79 
In summary, the codification submitted by the advisory commit­
tee to the Supreme Judicial Court was organized substantially along 
the structural lines of the Federal Rules of Evidence, with a number of 
departures from specific federal provisions, many of which are contro­
versial. Shortly after the proposed Massachusetts rules were submit­
ted in July, 1980, the court asked a number of organizations, including 
the Boston Bar Association, to comment on the proposal.80 On June 
21, 1982, the court requested briefs regarding the proposed rules,81 
and numerous organizations responded.82 The brief of the Boston Bar 
Association, which included seventy pages of argument, was an at­
tempt at a comprehensive treatment of the rules.83 Though impossible 
73. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 901-02, supra note 2. 
74. Id. at Rule 902(11). 
75. Id. at Rule 903. The basis for this narrower approach was Maine's version of the 
rule. Id. at Rule 903 advisory committee's note. See ME. R. EVID. 903. 
76. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 1001-08, supra note 2. 
77. Id. at Rule 1100(a). 
78. Id. at Rule 1101(b). 
79. If adopted, the code would have been cited as "Mass. R. Evid." See id. at Rule 
1102. 
80. BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 1. 
81. Id. 
82. SJC Rejects Evidence Code, 11 MASS. LAW. WKLY. 457, 483 (1983). 
83. BBA Brief, supra note 18. The contributors to the brief included two successive 
chairmen of the Committee on Civil Procedure of the Boston Bar Association, Daniel B. 
Bickford and Robert J. Sherer, and Civil Procedure Committee members William H. 
Baker, Jean F. Farrington, F. Anthony Mooney, Stuart T. Rossman, and the author of this 
Article, most of whom met weekly over the course of the fall of 1980, to the spring of 1981, 
to discuss and analyze the proposed code. 
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to assess with precision, it was this author's impression that most of 
the interested organizations believed that codification of Massachu­
setts evidence law was sensible, especially if it was modeled on the 
federal rules, and that the only real issue to be decided by the Supreme 
Judicial Court was the authoritative version of the wording of certain 
individual rules.84 Consequently, the Boston Bar Association brief 
spent only five pages extolling the virtues of a codified system of evi­
dence and its remaining sixty-five pages carefully analyzing and sug­
gesting improvements in the wording of individual proposed rules. 85 
It came as a bit of a shock, therefore, when at oral argument on 
September 9, 1982,86 a majority of the court sitting en bane appeared 
to be more interested in discussing the overall issue of codification 
rather than perspectives on individual proposed rules. Some advocates 
realized belatedly that efforts to make the code more perfect might 
result in no code at all, and at least one short article was written as a 
plea to the court to adopt some codification, preferably based on the 
federal rules, as the evidence law of the commonwealth. 87 
Unfortunately, on December 30, 1982, the court declined codifi­
cation in a short "announcement."88 After thanking all involved for 
their efforts, the announcement indicated that the proposed rules 
presented at least three problems: "(I) careful coordination with the 
Legislature" would be required "to repeal, revise, or modify many 
statutes which deal with the admissibility and effect of evidence; (2) 
many of the Proposed Rules involve[d] departure[s] from the princi­
ples set forth in the Federal Rules ... ; and (3) some of the Proposed 
Rules [were] subject to significant and arguably valid criticisms."89 
While the announcement did not specify which proposed rules in cate­
gories (2) and (3) troubled the court, "a majority of the Justices"90 had 
a more philosophical opposition to the Proposed Rules. Part of the 
opposition stemmed from a conclusion that "promulgation of rules of 
84. For instance, the Civil Procedure Committee of the Boston Bar Association was 
"unanimous in favoring a codification of rules governing evidence in the courts of the 
[c]ommonwealth" and supported "strongly ... basing the codification upon the actual (and 
proposed) Federal Rules of Evidence ... departing from that basis only rarely." BBA 
Brief, supra note 18, at 1-2. 
85. Id. at 1-70. See also Paul G. Garrity & Samuel Nagler, Impeachment and Reha­
bilitation of Witnesses by Evidence of Character and Past Conduct Under Proposed Massa­
chusetts Rules ofEvidence 608 and 609,67 MASS. L. REV. 13 (1982). 
86. SJC Announcement, supra note 1. 
87. Jeremiah F. Healy III, Codification of Massachusetts Evidence Law, 11 MASS. 
LAW. WKLY. 153 (1982). 
88. SJC Announcement, supra note 1. 
89. Id. 
90. [d. 
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evidence would tend to restrict the development of common-law prin­
ciples pertaining to the admissibility of evidence."91 Another factor 
was "the view of some of the Justices that the Federal Rules of Evi­
dence [had] not led to uniform practice in the various Federal 
courts."92 A third reason for the opposition was the opinion that the 
federal rules were, "in some instances, less well adapted to the needs of 
modem trial practice than current Massachusetts law."93 
Therefore, "a majority of the Justices ... concluded that it would 
not be advisable to adopt the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evi­
dence at the present time."94 The announcement went on to suggest 
that the proposed rules had "substantial value as a comparative stan­
dard in the continued and historic role of the courts in developing 
principles of law relating to evidence ... [and] invited [parties] to cite 
the Proposed Rules, wherever appropriate, in briefs and memoranda 
submitted."95 
Shortly after the announcement, a number of individuals associ­
ated with the proposed rules project were interviewed. Some accepted 
the decision graciously, others were surprised or disappointed.96 
Judge Fenton, the chairperson of the advisory committee indicated 
that he thought "the Proposed Rules [would] still be used as a stan­
dard for developing rules of evidence on a caseby case basis."97 As 
the next section of this Article will demonstrate, the chairperson's 
comment was at least partly prophetic. 
II. 	 THE MASSACHUSETIS COURTS' TREATMENT OF THE 
PROPOSED RULES 
The Supreme Judicial Court's invitation to the bar to cite to the 
proposed code was repeated in the Chief Justice's next annual report98 




94. Id. (emphasis added). 
95. Id. (emphasis added). 
96. SJC Rejects Evidence Code, supra note 82, at 483. Advisory committee member 
Richard O. Gelinas, one of those "surprised by the [c]ourt's decision," was quoted as say­
ing he "was not aware of any great body of opposition to the Proposed Rules and ... really 
thought they would be ... adopted." [d. 
97. Id. 
98. Edward F. Hennessey, The State of the Judiciary: Seventh Annual Report of the 
Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 68 MASS. L. REV. 3, 7 (1983). 
99. See, e.g., Grant v. Lewis/Boyle, Inc., 557 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 n.3 (Mass. 1990); 
Commonwealth v. Trapp, 485 N.E.2d 162, 166 n.5 (Mass. 1985). 
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Massachusetts rules were officially submitted to the court in July, 
1980, both the Supreme Judicial Court and the Massachusetts Appeals 
Court began citing to them. loo Indeed, prior to the rejection of the 
proposed code on December 30, 1982, the commonwealth's highest 
court cited to the proposed Massachusetts rules in thirty cases, and the 
commonwealth's intermediate appellate court cited to the proposed 
rules in fourteen cases.101 An exhaustive review of all the cases deal· 
ing with the proposed Massachusetts rules is not possible here. 102 
However, an overview of the types of citations made and an analysis of 
selected cases is helpful to understanding how the rules have been used 
in case law. 
Prior to the December, 1982, rejection of the proposed code, the 
overwhelming majority of Supreme Judicial Court citations to the 
Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence noted the ways in which 
the rules supported existing Massachusetts law. I03 Several cases cited 
to both the Proposed Massachusetts Rules and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 104 Occasionally, within a single case, the court would cite 
both to proposed rules that supported existing Massachusetts law and 
to proposed rules that contrasted with such law.lOs 
After the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the proposed code in 
December, 1982, courts continued to cite to those proposed Massa· 
chusetts rules that supported existing Massachusetts law. 106 In some 
100. See. e.g., Bishop v. Klein, 402 N.E.2d 1365, 1370 (Mass. 1980) (citing Proposed 
Massachusetts Rule 510 as support for existing Massachusetts law); Commonwealth v. 
Greene, 404 N.E.2d 110, 112 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 
803(5) as partially supporting and partially restricting existing Massachusetts law). 
101. Search of LEXIS, States library, Mass file, (Jan. 16, 1992). 
102. See McNAUGHT & FLANNERY, supra note 2. for a collection of these citations. 
103. See. e.g., Commonwealth v. Maltais, 438 N.E.2d 847, 853 (Mass. 1982) (citing 
to Proposed Massachusetts Rule 606(b) on juror competency); Commonwealth v. Booker. 
436 N.E.2d 160, 163 (Mass. 1982) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 401 on relevance); 
Commonwealth v. Perry. 433 N.E.2d 446, 450 n.9 (Mass. 1982) (citing Proposed Massa­
chusetts Rule 403 on prejudicial effect of otherwise relevant evidence). 
104. See. e.g., Shore v. Shore, 432 N.E.2d 526, 527 n.2 (Mass. 1982) (quoting Federal 
Rule 411 and Proposed Massachusetts Rule 411 on exclusion of evidence on insurance); 
Wingate v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 432 N.E.2d 474, 478 (Mass. 1982) (citing Federal 
Rule 805 and Proposed Massachusetts Rule 805 on hearsay within hearsay). 
105. See. e.g., Commonwealth v. Collett, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1229 n.4, 1232 (Mass. 
1982) (noting that Proposed Massachusetts Rule 503 is contrary to existing statutory privi­
lege laws, but Proposed Massachusetts Rule 1000a) supports existing common law on a 
trial judge's determination of legal questions); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 434 N.E.2d 
163, 169-70 & n.8 (Mass. 1982) (stating that Proposed Massachusetts Rule 804(a)(5) re­
garding unavailability of a hearsay declarant is consistent with existing Massachusetts law, 
but Proposed Rule 804(a). in general, would expand existing Massachusetts law on 
unavailability). 
106. See. e.g .• Commonwealth v. Amral, 554 N.E.2d 1189. 1196 (Mass. 1990) (citing 
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such situations, the court also continued to pair the proposed state 
rule with the federal rule. I07 However, more diversity of citation also 
began to appear. The courts began to contrast existing Massachusetts 
law with proposed rule counterparts more frequently. lOS The courts 
also cited to the proposed Massachusetts rules with little or no discus­
sion either because the parties to the litigation had failed to argue the 
code standard,l09 or because the proposed rule was not applicable to 
the facts of the current case. 11O The courts even occasionally used the 
rules arguendo. III 
Without question, however, the Supreme Judicial Court's most 
important citations to the proposed code have been the surprisingly 
few situations in which the court has either adopted or rejected indi­
vidual provisions of proposed rules as the common law of the com­
monwealth. Accordingly, a closer examination of these cases is 
appropriate. 
The first case in which the Supreme Judicial Court appeared to 
embrace an aspect of the proposed code was Commonwealth v. 
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 509(c)(3) on the privilege regarding an informer's identity); 
McNamara v. Honeyman, 546 N.E.2d 139,146 n.1O (Mass. 1989) (citing Proposed Massa­
chusetts Rule 803(7) on absence of business record); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 537 
N.E.2d 146, 148 (Mass. 1989) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 90l(b)(5)-(6) on au­
thentication of voice); Commonwealth v. Comtois, 506 N.E.2d 503, 508 (Mass. 1987) (cit­
ing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803(4) on statement for medical diagnosis or treatment). 
107. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 557 N.E.2d 1380, 1382 (Mass. 1990) 
(pairing Federal Rule 401 with Proposed Massachusetts Rule 401 on relevancy); Common­
wealth v. Fuller, 506 N.E.2d 852, 855 n.9 (Mass. 1987) (pairing Federal Rule 803(2) with 
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803(2) on excited utterances); Commonwealth v. Gil, 471 
N.E.2d 30, 40 (Mass. 1984) (pairing Federal Rule 805 with Proposed Massachusetts Rule 
805 on hearsay within hearsay). 
108. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dockham, 542 N.E.2d 591,599 (Mass. 1989) (cit­
ing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 405(a) on methods of proving character); Jacobs v. Town 
Clerk, 525 N.E.2d 658, 660 (Mass. 1988) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 301(a) on 
effect of presumption); Commonwealth v. Monico, 488 N.E.2d 1168, 1175 n.9 (Mass. 1986) 
(citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 701 on lay opinion evidence); Three Juveniles v. 
Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1205 n.3 (Mass. 1983) (citing Proposed Massachusetts 
Rule 501 on privileges), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984). 
109. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hartman, 534 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 n.9 (Mass. 1989) 
'. (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 201 on judicial notice). 
110. See, e.g., Sacco V. Roupenian, 564 N.E.2d 386, 388 n.3 (Mass. 1990) (citing 
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 703 on the bases of expert testimony); Department of Reve­
nue v. Sorrentino, 557 N.E.2d 1376, 1380 (Mass. 1990) (citing Proposed Massachusetts 
Rule 801(d)(I)(B) on adoptive admissions and Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803(16) on 
ancient documents). 
111. See, e.g., District Attorney V. Board of Selectmen, 481 N.E.2d 1128, 1130 n.4 
(Mass. 1985) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 501(a)(I) on the attorney-client privi­
lege of a public client); Commonwealth V. Goldman, 480 N.E.2d 1023, 1028 n.7 (Mass.), 
cerro denied, 474 U.S. 906 (1985) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 512). 
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Weichell,l12 which was argued to the court en banc 113 prior to the 
December, 1982, rejection of the proposed rules, but decided after that 
rejection had been announced.1I4 In Weichell, the defendant asked 
the court to reverse his conviction for first degree murder on a number 
of grounds, including the admission against him of a photostatic copy 
of an "Identikit" composite created by a police officer with the help of 
an eyewitness. llS Massachusetts common law, as it existed at that 
time, dictated that the court exclude composites when offered as sub­
stantive evidence of identification of the defendant as the cUlprit. 116 In 
an intervening case, Commonwealth v. Blaney,1I7 the court did not 
reach the issue of the admissibility of an "Identikit" composite be­
cause it determined that the composite drawing in Blaney could not 
have been prejudicial to the defendant. lIs The composite in Weichell 
was offered at trial only for corroboration of the witness' in-court iden­
tification of the defendant,1I9 a use the court had previously held not 
to be hearsay on the ground that evidence of corroboration is not of­
fered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the corroborating 
statement. 120 Despite those earlier holdings, the court in Weichell 
stated that a composite, though perhaps not even a "statement" under 
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(a),121 is clearly within the 
801(d)(1)(C)122 exception to the definition of "hearsay" and therefore 
112. 453 N.E.2d 1038 (Mass. 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
113. Since the defendant had been convicted in the Massachusetts Superior Court of 
murder in the first degree, his appeal went directly to the Supreme Judicial Court rather 
than the Massachusetts Appeals Court. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 278, § 33E (1990). 
114. Weichell, 453 N.E.2d at 1038. 
115. Id. at 1042. Justice Liacos described in some detail the process of "composing" 
a composite. Id. at 1049 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
116. Commonwealth v. McKenna, 244 N.E.2d 560, 567 (Mass. 1969). 
117. 442 N.E.2d 389 (Mass. 1982). 
118. Id. at 393. The Massachusetts Appeals Court decision in Blaney did discuss the 
hearsay issue of admissibility of the composite, citing by a "cf." signal to Proposed Massa­
chusetts Rule 801(d)(I)(C) in the course of deciding that the composite was not inadmissi­
ble hearsay. Commonwealth v. Blaney, 428 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981), rev'd, 
442 N.E.2d 389 (Mass. 1982). See Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(I)(C), supra note 2. 
119. Commonwealth v. Weichell, 453 N.E.2d 1038, 1043 (Mass. 1983) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
120. Id. (citing prior cases). 
121. Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(a) provides as follows: "Definitions-The 
following definitions apply under this article: (a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral 
or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an 
assertion." Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 801(a), supra note 2. 
122. Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(I)(C) provides as follows: "(d) State­
ments which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-(I) Prior statement by wit­
ness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement, and the statement is ... (C) one of identification of a person after 
perceiving him." Id. at Rule 801(d)(I)(C). 
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is admissible on the issue of identity for substantive purposes, and not 
merely for corroboration. 123 However, despite this analysis, the ma­
jority ultimately "concluded" that an "Identikit" composite is admis­
sible as substantive evidence on identity without citing to Proposed 
Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(1)(C) as authority.124 
Justice Liacos filed a vigorous dissent,125 in which he argued that 
the risk of prejudice to the defendant was high because the eyewitness' 
opportunity to observe the perpetrator was slight and because the 
prosecutor emphasized the composite in closing argument. 126 In the 
dissent's view, the reliability of a composite is too questionable and its 
status as hearsay too clear, especially given the court's abandonment 
in earlier cases of any distinction between fully "substantive" and 
merely "corroborative" evidence on identification.127 However, Jus­
tice Liacos discussed the proposed Massachusetts rule only in a foot­
note and then only by way of paraphrasing the non-hearsay effect of 
the rule itself. 128 
The next case to discuss an aspect of the proposed Massachusetts 
rules cast some doubt on the court's intention in Weichell. In Com­
monwealth v. Daye, 129 the court attempted to resolve several difficult 
issues involving out-of-court statements on the identification issue. At 
the trial level, two eyewitnesses to a shooting could not, or would not, 
identify the defendant in the courtroom as the perpetrator. l3O On the 
stand, Witness A denied having made a prior identification of the de­
fendant from a photographic array.l3l Witness B recalled having se­
lected a few photos from the array that Witness B thought showed the 
perpetrator. 132 The prosecutor subsequently called to the stand a po­
lice officer who testified that both Witnesses A and B had positively 
123. Commonwealth v. Weichell, 453 N.E.2d 1038, 1044 (Mass. 1983), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1032 (1984). The court did indicate, however, that while the composite was ad­
missible substantively, if it were standing alone as the only evidence of identification, it 
might not be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Id. at 1044 n.8. 
124. Id. at 1045. Presumably, the majority used the word "concJude[d]" because its 
ruling on substantive admissibility was technically not a "holding," since the composite 
had been entered into evidence at the trial level with an instruction limiting its effect to 
corroboration. Id. at 1043. 
125. Id. at 1048 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
126. Id. at 1048-49 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
127. Id. at 1052 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
128. Id. at 1051 n.5 (Liacos, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor also dissented in 
Weichell, referring to his dissenting opinion in Blaney. Id. at 1053 (citing Commonwealth 
v. Blaney, 442 N.E.2d 389, 397-99 (Mass. 1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting». 
129. 469 N.E.2d 483 (Mass. 1984). 
130. Id. at 486. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
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identified a photo of the defendant from the array as the gunman at 
the scene. 133 The trial judge instructed the jury that the officer's testi­
mony could be used as evidence of defendant's guilt. 134 
When the defendant appealed this aspect of the case, the Massa­
chusetts Appeals Court reversed.135 That court believed that the of­
ficer's testimony regarding Witness A was improperly admitted 
because Witness A had explicitly disclaimed making the prior photo­
graphic identification, and thus the defendant's opportunity to cross­
examine Witness A at trial would not afford the defendant a genuine 
opportunity to test the officer's testimony regarding Witness A's al­
leged earlier photographic identification.136 By contrast, the Massa­
chusetts Appeals Court upheld the admissibility of the officer's 
testimony regarding Witness B on the ground that Witness B had ad­
mitted on the stand that he had made a prior identification from the 
array. 137 
At first, the Massachusetts Appeals Court decision seems odd in 
light of Weichell. If the Supreme Iudicial Court had intended to adopt 
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(1)(C) in Weichell, then testi­
mony from the officer regarding the prior identifications by both wit­
nesses should have been admissible in Daye on the face of the rule. 138 
The opinion in Weichell was rendered by the Supreme Judicial Court 
after Daye was argued at the Massachusetts Appeals Court level, but 
before it was decided. 139 However, the Massachusetts Appeals Court 
decision in Daye cited to Weichell only briefly,14O to Federal Rule 
801(d)(1)(C) only in passing,141 and to Proposed Massachusetts Rule 
801(d)(1)(C) not at all. 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted further review in the Daye 
case. 142 After discussing several of its common-law precedents in the 
area of identification,143 the majority elaborated upon its decision in 
Weichell. The court believed that it correctly decided in Weichell that 
133. Id. at 487. 
134. Id. 
135. Commonwealth v. Daye, 454 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983), rev'd, 469 
N.E.2d 483 (Mass. 1984). 
136. Id. at 504. 
137. Id. at 505-06. 
138. See supra note 122. 
139. Compare Commonwealth v. Daye, 454 N.E.2d 502 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983), 
rev'd, 469 N.E.2d 483 (Mass. 1984) with Commonwealth v. WeicheU, 453 N.E.2d 1038 
(Mass. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
140. Daye, 454 N.E.2d at 505. 
141. Id. at 506. 
142. Daye, 469 N.E.2d at 485. 
143. Id. at 487-88. 
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testimony by a nonidentifying witness (such as the police officer in 
Daye) concerning an extrajudicial identification by another witness 
could be admitted as substantive evidence of identification and not 
merely as corroboration of the identifying witness's testimony. 144 The 
court also reaffirmed the probative worth of prior identifications be­
cause, by definition, they are made closer in time to the litigated inci­
dent than are identifications at trial. 145 However, the court disaffirmed 
the probative value of a nonidentifying witness testifying to an alleged 
prior identification of an "identifying" witness when the latter denies 
ever having made the prior identification. 146 Accordingly, the major­
ity implied that it did not adopt Proposed Massachusetts Rule 
801(d)(l)(C) in Weichell and stated that it agreed with authorities that 
have construed Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(C) as prohibiting such no­
nidentifying witness testimony where the "identifying" witness denies 
the prior identification.147 The majority in Daye therefore concluded 
that the officer's testimony regarding Witness A's prior identification 
should not have been admitted. 148 The majority also concluded that 
the officer's testimony regarding Witness B's prior identification 
should not have been admitted, apparently because the prosecution 
failed to have Witness B identify at trial the photo that Witness B had 
selected from the array.149 
144. Id. at 487 n.8. 
145. Id. at 488. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 488 n.9. 
148. Id. at 488. 
149. Id. at 489. Analysis of Daye for the purposes of this Article is complicated by 
the other major identification issue dealt with in the case: the admissibility of certain grand 
jury testimony. Id. at 489-90. At trial, after Witness A denied making the photographic 
array, the prosecutor asked him whether he had identified the defendant as the perpetrator 
before the grand jury. Id. at 489. The prosecutor was then permitted to have the witness 
read from the transcript of his grand jury testimony. Id. Witness A thereafter recanted his 
grand jury identification testimony, saying he had "exaggerated" and "told things that 
weren't true" in that testimony. Id. at 489 n.lO. At trial, the prosecutor argued success­
fully that such grand jury testimony fit under the hearsay exception for past recollection 
recorded and thus was admissible substantively on the issue of identification of the defend­
ant as the perpetrator. Id. at 490. On appeal, the prosecutor argued instead that the grand 
jury testimony should have been admitted because the Supreme Judicial Court should 
adopt Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(I)(A). Id. at 483. The text of Proposed Mas­
sachusetts Rule 801(d)(I)(A) provided as follows: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if­
(I) Prior Statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is 
(A) inconsistent with his testimony and was given under oath subject to the pen­
alty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition. 
Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(I)(A), supra note 2. 
The Supreme Judicial Court quickly dismissed the viability of the prosecution's reli­
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Since the court in Daye believed a new tria1 was necessary, ISO it 
explored the prosecution's request regarding the proposed rule, again 
expressly recognizing the va1ue of the proposed code "as a compara­
tive standard for the common-law evolution of our evidentiary 
law."lsl After reviewing common-law precedents holding the "ortho­
dox" view that prior inconsistent statements are hearsay when offered 
substantively,IS2 the court justified that view on the ground that the 
jury generally would be asked to credit a statement made without the 
declarant having been under oath, subject to cross-examination, or 
even in the presence of the jury when the statement was made. IS3 
However, after reviewing more "modem" views,ls4 the majority ex­
pressed a preference for the "moderate modem" view reflected in Pro­
posed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(1)(A) that probative value and 
substantive use should be accorded on1y to "those prior inconsistent 
statements given under oath in instances where a record of the state­
ment is likely to be available."lss The majority felt that even though 
Witness A in the Daye case recanted his earlier grand jury testimony 
on the stand, the fact that Witness A admitted making the grand jury 
statements provided the defendant with sufficient capacity to effec­
tively cross-examine Witness A on his prior inconsistent statement. IS6 
After conducting a "head count" of the states,IS7 most of which 
permit the substantive use of grand jury testimony under one "mod­
em" theory or another, the majority in Daye seemed about to adopt 
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(1)(A) in toto. However, the 
court expressly declined to do so, saying that it deferred to "the incre­
mental process of common-law development" to determine the admis­
sibility of other forms of prior inconsistent statements, arguably 
permitted under Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(1)(C), but not 
ance upon past recollection recorded, as the witness/declarant denied that the statement 
before the grand jury was true when it was made. Daye, 469 N.E.2d at 490. The prosecu­
tion briefed the issue of substantive use of prior inconsistent statements in its brief to the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court, but that court did not discuss this issue in its opinion. Id. at 
490 n.12. Even though this argument was never raised by the Commonwealth at trial, the 
Supreme Judicial Court nevertheless permitted the prosecution to argue prior inconsistent 
statement admissibility on appeal. Id. 
150. Daye, 469 N.E.2d at 490. 
151. Id. at 491 (citing Commonwealth v. Weichell, 453 N.E.2d 1038 (Mass. 1983), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984». 
152. Id. at 490-91. 
153. Id. at 491 (quoting CHARLES T. MCCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE § 251, at 601 (2d ed. 1972». 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 491-92. 
157. Id. at 493 n.14. 
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presented by the record in the Daye case itself. ISS The majority also 
imposed two express conditions to admissibility: a requirement that 
the witness/declarant at trial have a recollection of the events to which 
the statement relates and a requirement that the prior statement have 
been "that of the witness, rather than that of the interrogator" asking 
fact-filled, yes-or-no questions. 159 The court thus permitted the sub­
stantive use at trial of a witness' prior inconsistent statements before a 
grand jury for the reasons behind Proposed Massachusetts Rule 
801 (d)(1)(A), 160 without adopting the rule itself.161 
Justice Liacos, while concurring in the need for a new trial, again 
dissented vigorously to the court's exploration of another proposed 
rule of evidence. 162 His concerns centered on unanswered state con­
stitutional questions regarding confrontation rights of the defend­
ant,163 the questionable value of later grand jury statements as 
probative of the events being litigated,l64 and the chance that permit­
ting prior inconsistent statements made before the grand jury would 
also permit the police officer's testimony of Witnesses A and B's prior 
identification, despite the majority's purported avoidance of this 
possibility. 165 
Some of Justice Liacos' concerns about the expansive use of state­
ments from grand jury testimony were borne out in a later case dis­
cussing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(1)(A), Commonwealth v. 
Berrio. 166 In Berrio, the prosecution alleged that the defendant/father 
158. Id. at 493. In an earlier note in the Daye case, the majority opinion referred to 
several other categories of Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(I)(A) statements, such as 
depositions in civil cases and testimony from probable cause hearings or prior trials. Id. at 
485 n.2. 
159. Id. at 495. The court in Daye, consistent with its decision in Weichell, also 
stated that prior inconsistent grand jury testimony, while admissible substantively, would 
not be sufficient standing alone to support a conviction. Id. For a discussion of Weichell 
see supra note 122. 
160. Id. at 492. These are mainly concerns about intimidation of witnesses resulting 
in trial testimony unhelpful to the prosecution. There was apparently a significant possibil­
ity of witness intimidation in the Daye trial. See id. at 486 n.6. 
161. Id. at 495-96. The court also indicated that its limitations on the use of prior 
inconsistent statements could not be avoided by resorting to Proposed Massachusetts Rule 
801(d)(I)(C) on prior identifications, even though that rule "is consistent with our cases 
governing probative use of extrajudicial identifications." Id. at 488 n.9. 
162. Id. at 496 (Liacos, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Liacos 
was joined by Justice O'Connor, who also dissented in Weichell. See supra note 128. 
163. Daye, 469 N.E.2d at 496 (Liacos, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
The majority dismissed federal constitutional concerns on the authority of California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). See Daye, 469 N.E.2d at 492. 
164. Daye, 469 N.E.2d at 497 (Liacos, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
165. Id. See supra note 161. 
166. 551 N.E.2d 496 (Mass. 1990). 
23 1993] CODIFICATION OF EVIDENCE LAW 
had sexually abused his daughter, allegations that the daughter denied 
at trial. 167 When the daughter testified that she had lied to the grand 
jury because she was angry with her father, the trial judge permitted 
the prosecutor to offer grand jury statements by the daughter to sub­
stantively prove that the abuse had occurred. 168 The defendant in 
Be"io argued that the Daye case was limited to substantive use of 
grand jury testimony for the issue of identification only.169 After 
transferring the case from the Massachusetts Appeals Court, the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that in Daye, "we simply adopted Pro­
posed Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) subject to conditions declared by 
us. Neither the rule nor Daye is limited to identification evidence."17o 
The court went on to reject the defendant's argument that the Daye 
conditions had not been satisfied in his case.l7l Chief Justice Liacos 
again dissented vigorously on the grounds he raised in his opinion in 
Daye. l72 
The one case to date in which the Supreme Judicial Court whole­
heartedly, if not unanimously, adopted provisions of the proposed 
Massachusetts code is Ruszcyk v. Secretary of Public Safety.173 In 
Ruszcyk, the plaintiff was a municipal police officer in training who 
was injured while going through a doorway at the Massachusetts State 
Police Academy.174 At trial, the plaintiff offered to prove that the 
commandant of the academy, a week after the incident, told two mu­
nicipal officials that a state trooper at the academy had "kicked in the 
door on the plaintiff."17S The trial judge excluded the statement on 
the ground that the plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence that the 
commandant had been authorized to make statements admitting to 
liability on behalf of the Commonwealth. 176 
After transferring the case on its own initiative from the Massa­
chusetts Appeals Court,177 the Supreme Judicial Court held that there 
167. Id. at 500. 
168. Id. at 500-01. 
169. Id. at 501. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 501-02 (Liacos, C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
173. 517 N.E.2d 152 (Mass. 1988). Shortly before this Article went to press, the 
Supreme Judicial Court decided Commonwealth v. Sneed, 597 N.E.2d 1346 (Mass. 1992). 
In Sneed, the court decided to adopt Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803(18) on the admissi­
bility of learned treatises. Id. at 1351. The proposed rule is similar, but not identical, to 
Federal Rule 803(18). Id. at 1350 n.6. 
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was insufficient evidence of actual authority in the commandant under 
common-law precedents in Massachusetts. 178 However, the majority 
decided to accept the plaintiff's suggestion, made also to the trial 
judge,179 that the court adopt Proposed Massachusetts Rule 
801(d)(2)(O), the so-called "scope of employment" vicarious party ad­
mission exception to the hearsay definition.180 In doing so, the court 
also refused to read into the proposed Massachusetts rule a require­
ment that the employee/declarant have personal knowledge of the 
event described in his or her statement. 181 While such a refusal is con­
sistent with federal interpretations of the parallel federal rule,182 the 
court did suggest that personal knowledge, as well as other considera­
tions,183 should be considered by a state court trial judge in making a 
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 403 184 determination of whether the 
probative value of the statement is substantially outweighed by any 
prejudicial effect it causes the opponent of the evidence. 18s Thus, the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Ruszcyk adopted two proposed rules by 
combining them. Justice O'Connor in his dissent, maintained that 
even if Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(1)(C) ought to be 
adopted, the facts of this case were insufficient to establish that the 
commandant's statement was within the scope of the commandant's 
employment. 186 
The one case to date in which the court has discussed, but de­
clined to adopt a proposed rule, is Department of Youth Services v. A 
178. [d. at 154. 
179. [d. 
180. Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(2)(O) provides as follows: "(d) State­
ments which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if- ... (2) Admission by party­
opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is ... (0) a statement by his agent 
or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during 
the existence of the relationship." Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D), supra note 2. 
181. Ruszcyk, 517 N.E.2d at 154. 
182. [d. 
183. These other factors include credibility of the witness, the proponent's need for 
the particular piece of evidence, and the reliability of the evidence, all of which the trial 
judge should consider outside the hearing of the jury as provided in Proposed Massachu- . 
setts Rule 1000c). [d. at 155. 
184. Proposed Massachusetts Rule 403 provides as follows: 

EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, CONFU­

SION, OR WASTE OF TIME-Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con­

fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 

waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 403, supra note 2. 
185. Ruszcyk, 517 N.E.2d at ISS. 
186. [d. at 156-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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Juvenile. 187 In A Juvenile, the Supreme Judicial Court, again after 
taking the case on direct appellate review,188 was asked by the Com­
monwealth to enlarge the bases for admission of expert opinion by 
adopting Proposed Massachusetts Rule 703. 189 At trial, a psychiatrist 
had testified against the juvenile defendant, basing his opinion that the 
juvenile presented "a very significant danger [to] the physical well­
being of the community"l90 on a number of internal department re­
ports that he had reviewed, but that were never offered into evi­
dence. 191 Under Massachusetts common law, such an opinion must be 
based on some combination of the witness' own personal knowledge, 
admitted facts, or the testimony of other witnesses given or to be given 
at trial. 192 Under the second sentence of Proposed Massachusetts 
Rule 703, the psychiatrist's review of the records would be a sufficient 
basis for his opinion provided such records were "reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or infer­
ences upon the subject."193 After noting the justification for the paral­
lel federal rule,194 the court expressed its concern over the "serious 
potential for abuse,"19s especially the possibility that a litigant would 
seek an expert who would use inadmissible evidence as the basis for his 
or her opinion in order to allow the jury to hear that inadmissible 
evidence. 196 Because of these concerns, the court decided not to ac­
cept the principles of Proposed Massachusetts Rule 703. 197 Instead, 
187. 499 N.E.2d 812 (Mass. 1986). But see Margaret E. Foley, Comment, Evi­
dence-Supreme Judicial Court Partially Adopts Proposed Massachusetts Rule ofEvidence 
703, Department of Youth Serv. v. A Juvenile, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 954 (1987). 
188. A Juvenile, 499 N.E.2d at 813. 
189. Id. at 819. The text of Proposed Massachusetts Rule 703 is as follows: 
BASES OF OPINION TEsTIMONY BY EXPERTS--The facts or data in the particular 
case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived 
by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. 
Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 703, supra note 2. 
190. A Juvenile, 499 N.E.2d at 815. 
191. Id. at 818. 
192. Id. 

193.. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 703, supra note 2. 

194. Basically, the court said that judges should accept in the courtroom what an 
expert, such as a doctor, would rely upon in making "life-and-death" decisions in a hospi­
tal. A Juvenile, 499 N.E.2d at 819 (quoting extensively from FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory 
committee's note, 28 U.S.C. app. 711 (1982)). 
195. Id. at 820 (quoting from David A. Schlueter, Emerging Problems Under the 
Federal Rules ofEvidence, 1983 A.B.A. SEC. LmG. 204,210). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 821. See Annotation, Admissibility of Testimony ofExpert, as to Basis of 
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the court took "a modest step"198 and struck a compromise between 
the common law and the proposed rule, stating that if the facts or data 
upon which the expert bases his or her opinion are admissible into 
evidence, and are of the sort that experts in that specialty reasonably 
rely upon in forming their real world opinions, then the expert may 
state the opinion without the facts or data actually being admitted into 
evidence. 199 The purpose of this compromise was to reduce the unnec­
essary introduction of admissible evidence that would serve no pur­
pose beyond being the basis for the expert's opinion.2OO 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Judicial Court's tendency to cite to 
the proposed rules frequently, but explore them rarely, affiicts the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court as well. While many opinions of the 
commonwealth's intermediate court of appellate jurisdiction have 
cited to the proposed Massachusetts rules, 201 few are noteworthy. 
Most of the appellate court's decisions citing the proposed rules did so 
to illustrate that a common law decision of the Supreme Judicial 
Court was in accord with a proposed rule. 202 To some extent, this 
tendency is understandable: the Massachusetts Appeals Court, as an 
intermediate appellate court, is presumably charged with correcting 
errors based on existing law rather than creating new law. Also, in a 
number of the cases in which the Supreme Judicial Court discussed 
the adoption of a proposed Massachusetts rule, that court took the 
relevant case from the Massachusetts Appeals Court203 before the lat­
ter court had an opportunity to express its opinion. However, in some 
cases the Massachusetts Appeals Court did anticipate the Supreme Ju­
dicial Court's later action.204 The Massachusetts Appeals Court also 
His Opinion. in Matters Otherwise Excludible as Hearsay-State Cases, 89 A.L.R. 4TH 456 
(1991). 
198. A Juvenile, 499 N.E.2d at 821. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. While somewhat cryptic, there is also a passage in A Juvenile that indicates 
that the court would be inclined to follow most of Proposed Massachusetts Rule 705 on 
order of proof for the examination of an expert. See id.; Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 705, supra 
note 2. See also Commonwealth v. Daye, 587 N.E.2d 194 (Mass. 1992). 
201. A total of 54 Massachusetts Appeals Court cases citing to one or more of the 
proposed rules was found by a search of LEXIS, States library, Mass file (Jan. 16, 1992). 
202. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 568 N.E.2d 604, 607 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1991) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 804(b)(3) on statements against interest); 
Genova v. Genova, 554 N.E.2d 1221, 1224 (Mass. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 557 N.E.2d 
1385 (Mass. 1990) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 105 on limited admissibility); In re 
Adoption of George, 537 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (citing Proposed Mas­
sachusetts Rule 803(8) on statements in public records). 
203. See supra text accompanying notes 166-200 (discussing Berrio, Ruszcyk, and A 
Juvenile). 
204. Commonwealth v. Blaney, 428 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981), rev'd, 
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upon occasion has turned to the proposed Massachusetts rules to af­
firm a trial judge's rejection of evidence expansion,20s to decide an is­
sue involving two conflicting lines of common-law precedent,206 and to 
contrast a current statute with the same concept under a proposed 
rule.207 
The proposed Massachusetts rules have fared even worse in the 
Massachusetts federal courts. Of course, federal trial courts every­
where are governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence in most proceed­
ingS.208 While several individual federal rules direct the federal trial 
judge to look to state evidence law when state substantive law provides 
the controlling rule of decision on the merits,209 historically few fed­
eral cases have cited to the proposed Massachusetts rules as gui­
dance. 2 \o Two of these cases are worthy of discussion. In the first, 
Command Transportation, Inc. v. Y.s. Line Corp. ,211 the issue was 
whether a former employee of a corporation could be considered "a 
442 N.E.2d 389 (Mass. 1982). In Blaney, the court raised the issue of the application of 
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(l)(C) to "Identikit" composites, the centerpiece of 
the Weichell case. See supra text accompanying notes 112-28. 
205. Simmons v. Yurchak, 551 N.E.2d 539 (Mass. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 554 
N.E.2d 851 (Mass. 1990). In Simmons, the court affirmed the trial judge's exclusion of 
evidence beyond expressions of pain by discussing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803(3) (on 
statements of present mental or physical condition), and Proposed Massachusetts Rule 403 
(on balancing probative value against the danger of misleading the jury), and the absence of 
a residuary hearsay rule exception in the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence. Id. at 
542. But see, FED. R. EVID. 803(24). 
206. Neitlich v. Peterson, 447 N.E.2d 671 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983). In Neitlich, the 
court used Proposed Massachusetts Rule 510 (on waiver of privilege) as guidance in choos­
ing between a broader and a narrower view of the scope of a waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege. Id. at 673-74. 
207. Commonwealth v. Clemons, 427 N.E.2d 761 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). In Clem­
ons, the court compared the definition of "psychotherapist" in the statutory patient-psy­
chotherapist privilege in chapter 233, § 20B of the Massachusetts General Laws with 
similar but broader terms in Proposed Massachusetts Rule 503. Id. at 764 n.3. Compare 
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 20B (1990) (amended 1977 Mass. Acts 817) with Prop. Mass. R. 
Evid. 503, supra note 2. 
208. FED. R. EVID. 101; FED. R. EVID. 1101. 
209. See. e.g., FED. R. EVID. 302 ("Presumptions"); FED. R. EVID. 501 ("Privi­
leges"); FED. R. EVID. 601 ("Competency of Witness"). 
210. Only four such cases could be found through a search of LEXIS, Genfed li­
brary, Dist file (Jan. 17, 1992). See. e.g., Siguel v. Trustees of Tufts College, 52 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 697 (D. Mass. 1990) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(2)(D) 
on scope of employment admission); Command Transp., Inc. v. Y.S. Line Corp., 116 
F.R.D. 94 (D. Mass. 1987) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 502(a)(2) on definition of 
representative of client for attorney-client privilege); N.O. v. Callahan, 110 F.R.D. 637 (D. 
Mass. 1986) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 508 on governmental privilege); Thomas 
v. Frederick, No. 83-3271-MA, slip op. (D. Mass. Feb. 22, 1984) (citing Proposed Massa­
chusetts Rule 609 on impeachment by criminal conviction). 
211. 116 F.R.D. 94 (D. Mass. 1987). 
28 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1 
representative of the client" within the corporation's attorney-client 
privilege.212 Since the issue arose in a diversity case, Magistrate Alex­
ander determined that the Massachusetts law of attorney-client privi­
lege would apply.213 However, she had difficulty finding any guidance 
under the Supreme Judicial Court's case law.214 Proposed Massachu­
setts Rule 502(a)(2)2IS contained the restrictive "control-group" test 
but this choice had been controversial at the advisory committee level 
and, moreover, was growing "old" as a standard and had not been 
embraced by the Supreme Judicial Court.216 Magistrate Alexander 
turned to a Massachusetts case217 that cited the Supreme Court's deci­
sion in Upjohn Co. v. United States 218 with approval, even though 
Upjohn involved the privilege status of a current, rather than former, 
employee of the corporate client.219 
In the second noteworthy federal case citing a proposed Massa­
chusetts rule, Sigue/ v. Trustees of Tufts College, 220 Judge Young was 
required to apply certain provisions from the Massachusetts Bar Asso­
ciation's standards of professional responsibility.221 In trying to deter­
mine whether the relevant disciplinary rule222 prohibited one party 
from interviewing former and current employees of a corporate oppo­
nent without the presence or prior approval of corporate counsel,223 
the judge looked at a 1982 decision of the Committee on Professional 
Ethics of the Massachusetts Bar Association.224 However, Judge 
Young's analysis of that 1982 decision, which would prohibit such pri­
212. [d. at 95. 
213. [d. 
214. rd. 
215. Proposed Massachusetts Rule 502(a)(2) provides as follows: "LAWYER-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE-(a) Definitions. As used in this rule ... (2) A 'representative of the client' is 
one having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered 
pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client." Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 502(a)(2), supra note 2. 
216. Command Transp., Inc. v. Y.S. Line Corp., 116 F.R.D. 94, 97 n.1O (D. Mass. 
1987). See supra text accompanying notes 41-45 for a discussion of Proposed Massachu­
setts Rule 502(a)(2). 
217. Commonwealth v. Goldman, 480 N.E.2d 1023, 1029 (Mass.), cert. denied,474 
U.S. 906 (1985). 
218. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
219. Command, 116 F.R.D. at 96-97. 
220. 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 697 (0. Mass. 1990). 
221. Local District Court Rule 5(d)(4)(B) of the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts adopts the provisions of Rule 3:07 of the Rules of the Massachu­
setts Supreme Judicial Court as the code of professional responsibility for members of the 
local federal district court bar. D. MASS. CT. R. 5(d)(4)(B). 
222. MASS. S.J.C. R. 3:07, DR 7-104(A)(I). 
223. Siguel, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 698. 
224. [d. 
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vate interviews,225 led him to believe that the decision turned on the 
fact that the ethics committee had believed that Massachusetts law on 
the scope of employment exception to the hearsay concept was about 
to be changed to conform with Proposed Massachusetts Rule 
801(d)(2)(D), permitting unauthorized employee admissions to be ad­
mitted against the corporate employer.226 Judge Young concluded 
that "[s]ince events have proved otherwise, there may be some occa­
sion to reconsider" the ethics committee decision.227 
What is the problem with Judge Young's analysis? The problem 
is that while the Supreme Judicial Court declined to adopt the Pro­
posed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence in toto, the court did adopt 
expressly Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(2)(D) as part of the 
commonwealth's evidence law in the Ruszcyk 228 case in January, 
1988, more than two years before the Sigue/ 229 case was considered. 
The majority justices of the Supreme Judicial Court in Weichell 
and Daye may believe that these cases from the state and federal 
courts in Massachusetts demonstrate the "value [of the proposed Mas­
sachusetts rules] as a comparative standard for the common-law 
evolution of our evidentiary law."23o The dissenters in those cases 
probably disagree. However, when one explores the foregoing in de­
tail, it is apparent that ten years of use of the proposed Massachusetts 
rules as a comparative standard has not particularly advanced the law 
of evidence in the commonwealth. Most of the citations to the pro­
posed rules have been makeweight, superfluous allusions to situations 
in which the proposed codified rule and actual common-law rule 
would have the same effect. Most of the remaining citations are 
acknowledgements of contrast between the rules, without helpful dis­
cussion, and many judges could have cited to the parallel federal rule 
as a "comparative standard." Except for Ruszcyk,231 those situations 
in which the Supreme Judicial Court actually did consider adopting a 
proposed Massachusetts rule resulted in either a rejection of the indi­
vidual rule232 or a grudging acceptance of the rationale behind the 
rule, heavily hedged with judicial conditions not found in the wording 
225. Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Corom. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 82-7, reprinted in 67 MASS. L. REv. 208 (1982). 
226. Siguel, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 698 n.1. 
227. Id. 
228. Ruszcyk v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, 517 N.E.2d 152, 155 (Mass. 1988). 
229. See Siguel, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 697. 
230. Commonwealth v. Daye, 469 N.E.2d 483, 491 (Mass. 1984). 
231. See supra text accompanying notes 173-86. 
232. See supra text accompanying notes 187-200 for a discussion of A Juvenile. 
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of the proposed rule itself.233 The reticence of the Massachusetts Ap­
peals Court to actually use the proposed rules to improve the com­
monwealth's evidence standards and the difficulty of the federal courts 
ascertaining evolving evidence law of the commonwealth, suggests 
that the Supreme Judicial Court's use of the proposed code does not 
provide much help to those with evidence questions. As the next sec­
tion of this Article demonstrates, the experience in other jurisdictions 
since the rejection of the proposed Massachusetts rules ten years ago 
makes even stronger the case for current codification of Massachusetts 
evidence law. 
III. CODIFICATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
There are numerous law review articles on the codification of evi­
dence law, both at the federal and state levels.234 Two of these articles 
were written on codifications in Arkansas23s and Maine236 by the orig­
inal reporter of the proposed Massachusetts rules.237 Given this body 
of literature, a brief summary of the history of codification might be 
helpful.238 
There were several attempts to codify evidence in the nineteenth 
century, with Oregon and California accepting a codification but New 
York rejecting one.239 In the 1920's, the Commonwealth Fund sug­
233. See supra text accompanying notes 129-65 for a discussion of Daye. 
234. See. e.g., Robert Banks, Jr., Some Comparisons Between the New Tennessee 
Rules ofEvidence and the Federal Rules ofEvidence-Part I, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 283 
(1990); Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the 
Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 255 (1984); Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., State 
Adaptation of the Federal Rules: The Pros and Cons, 43 OKLA. L. REv. 293 (1990); 
Michael W. Patrick, Toward a Codification of the Law of Evidence in North Carolina, 16 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 669 (1980); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Federal Rules ofEvidence 
and the Quality ofPractice in Federal Courts, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 173 (1978); John R. 
Schmertz, Jr., The First Decade Under Article VI of the Federal Rules ofEvidence: Some 
Suggested Amendments to Fill Gaps and Cure Confusion, 30 VILL. L. REv. 1367 (1985); 
Grady F. Tollison, Jr., A Plea for Adoption ofthe Proposed Mississippi Rules ofEvidence, 53 
MISS. L.J. 49 (1983); Leo H. Whinery, The Oklahoma Evidence Code: Ten Years ofJudi­
cial Review, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 193 (1990); L. Kinvin Wroth, The Federal Rules of Evi­
dence in the States: A Ten-Year Perspective, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1315 (1985); Irving Younger, 
Introduction to Symposium: The Federal Rules of Evidence, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 251 
(1984). 
235. Richard H. Field, A Code ofEVidencefor Arkansas?, 29 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1975). 
236. Richard H. Field, The Maine Rules ofEvidence: What They Are and How They 
Got That Way, 27 ME. L. REV. 203 (1975). 
237. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
238. For a more detailed treatment of this history, see Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 
175-83. For a more cynical treatment of the same, see Graham, supra note 234, at 298-99. 
239. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 177. 
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gested some modest, code-oriented reforms,24O but the American Law 
Institute ("ALI"), though at first interested in a restatement of evi­
dence, decided that the nationwide "law" of evidence was so defective 
and conflicting that a thorough revision would be more appropriate.241 
The culmination of this effort was the Model Code of Evidence, pub­
lished by the ALI in 1942.242 Despite the significant efforts of judges 
and scholars, including Professor Edmund M. Morgan as Reporter 
and Dean John Henry Wigmore as Chief Consultant, the Model Code 
of Evidence was never enacted in any jurisdiction.243 The code was 
criticized heavily, often on the ground that it provided too much dis­
cretion to the trial judge.244 
The next major effort at codification enjoyed slightly more suc­
cess. Using the model code as a basis, in 1950 the National Confer­
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws began drafting 245 the 
code that would be published as the Uniform Rules of Evidence in 
1953.246 However, only the states of California, Kansas, New Jersey 
and Utah adopted the Uniform Rules,247 with both California and 
New Jersey making substantial changes248 even though the Uniform 
Rules made an effort to avoid the perceived pitfalls of the predecessor 
model code. 249 
Though not widely embraced, the Uniform Rules of 1953 did 
form the basis of the effort that would culminate in the Federal Rules 
240. Id. at 177-78. 
241. MODEL CoDE OF EVIDENCE viii (Am. Law Inst. 1942), discussed in Patrick, 
supra note 234, at 671 n.8. 
242. MODEL CoDE OF EVIDENCE (Am. Law Inst. 1942). 
243. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 178; Tollison, supra note 234, at 54. Dean 
Wigmore eventually dissented from the final report on the Model Code. See John Henry 
Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code ofEvidence Rules: A Dissent, 28 A.B.A. J. 23 
(1942). 
244. See Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 179. For example, Massachusetts criticized 
the model code on this ground, as did Ca1ifornia, which already had a code of evidence. 
See RICHARD O. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN ApPROACH TO EVI­
DENCE 1191 (2d ed. 1982); Report of Massachusetts Bar Association on Proposed Code of 
Evidence ofAmerican Law Institute, 27 MASS. L.Q. 28, Apr. 1942, at I, 28. 
245. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 180. 
246. UNIF. R. EVID. (1953), reprinted in JAMES F. BAILEY III & OsCAR M. 
TRELLES II, 1 THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RE­
LATED DOCUMENTS 161-216 (1980). 
247. UNIF. R. EVID. 13 commissioners' prefatory note, 13A U.L.A. 214 (1980); Pat­
rick, supra note 234, at 671 n.l7. For greater detail on the state enactments, see Wroth, 
supra note 234, at 1317 n.6. The Panama Canal Zone and the Virgin Islands also adopted 
the 1953 version of the Uniform Rules. See Tollison, supra note 234, at 54 n.28. 
248. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 244, at 1193. See also Spencer A. Gard, 
Kansas Law and the New Uniform Rules ofEvidence, 2 KAN. L. REV. 333 (1954). 
249. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 244, at 1193-94. 
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of Evidence.25o Following a preliminary feasibility study on federal 
court codification, requested in 1961 by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States,251 a final report favorable to codification resulted in 
Chief Justice Earl Warren appointing an advisory committee in 1965 
to draft actual rules. 252 Preliminary drafts of the proposed federal 
rules were published widely in 1969 and 1971,253 but after the final 
report was promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
November, 1972, there was much criticism in Congress that the final 
report254 had not been given the same wide circulation as the earlier 
drafts.2s5 In what one commentator has called a "separation of pow­
ers showdown,"256 the Supreme Court promulgation, which would 
have been effective on July 1, 1973, was suspended by statute257 until 
legislative hearings could be held. After hearings on, and significant 
revisions to, the Supreme Court's version, Congress enacted "The 
Federal Rules of Evidence" as a statute, effective July 1, 1975.258 
Of the revisions made by Congress, the two most significant were 
in the areas of presumptions and privileges. Regarding presumptions, 
the Supreme Court in its 1972 promulgation prescribed the so-called 
"Morgan view" approach, which means that the effect of a presump­
tion is to shift the burden of persuasion on the presumed fact to the 
shoulders of the party opposing the presumption.259 Congress, fearful 
that the "Morgan view" gave too much weight to presumptions,260 
instead opted for the so-called "Thayer view," under which the sole 
effect of a presumption is to shift the burden of production of the pre­
250. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 180. 
251. A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility ofDeveloping Uniform 
Rules ofEvidence for the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 75 (1962). 
252. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 181. The advisory committee was chaired by Al­
bert E. Jenner, Jr., with Professor Edward W. Cleary as Reporter. Field, supra note 235, at 
3. 
253. 1969 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 24; 1972 Proposed Federal Rules, 
supra note 24. 
254. 1972 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 24. 
255. Field, supra note 235, at 4 n.9. 
256. Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 323, 332 (1991). 
257. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (superseded by the Federal 
Rules of Evidence). 
258. Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified at 
28 U.S.C. app. 733 (1988». Greater detail on the congressional action regarding the rules 
can be found in Wroth, supra note 234, at 1319 n.19. 
259. See 1972 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 24, at 336 (Rule 301). See also 
Edmund M. Morgan & John MacArthur Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evi­
dence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 912-13 (1937). 
260. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1326. For the detailed congressional treatment of 
this concern, see id. at 1326 n.69. 
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sumed fact to the shoulders of the party opposing the presumption. 
Under the federal rule, if the opposing party produces any evidence 
tending to show the non-existence of the presumed fact, the presump­
tion's "bubble" bursts.261 While Congress retained the Supreme 
Court's "Erie nod" in Federal Rule 302 (allowing states to supply 
their own rules regarding presumptions in civil cases),262 the House of 
Representatives and Senate deleted Proposed Federal Rule 303 on pre­
sumptions in criminal cases.263 
The changes wrought by Congress regarding privileges were, if 
anything, more substantial. The Supreme Court had proposed a de­
tailed code of privileges,264 including issues of waiver and comment on 
the claim of a privilege.265 Congress was concerned about forum­
shopping between state and federal courts based upon a federal abro­
gation and extension of state-derived privilege laws, many of which 
were controversial,266 Accordingly, the House of Representatives and 
the Senate enacted a single rule, Rule 501, which provided for privi­
lege law to be governed by federal court interpretation of common law 
and for another "Erie nod. "267 
Despite the wrangling at the federal level, other jurisdictions be­
gan to use the Federal Rules of Evidence even before those rules be­
came controlling law in the federal courts. The Proposed Federal 
Rules of Evidence as promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1972 were 
approved virtually intact by the National Conference of Commission­
ers on Uniform State Laws as the "new" Uniform Rules of Evidence 
in 1974, superseding the 1953 version.268 Both New Mexico and Wis­
consin adopted codifications based upon the proposed federal rules, 
261. See FED. R. EVID. 301. See also JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREA­
TISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW ch. 8 passim (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 
1898). 
262. FED. R. EVID. 302 (providing that a federal court should look to the presump­
tion law of a state where state law provides the rule of decision on the merits). See also 
Wroth, supra note 234, at 1327 n.75. 
263. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1328 n.81. 
264. 1972 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 24, at 356-82 (Rules 501-06). 
265. Id. 
266. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7075; S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7051. See also Berger, supra note 234, at 275; Patrick, supra note 234, 
at 690. 
267. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
268. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1319 n.21. Compare Unif. R. Evid. (1953) with 
UNIF. R. EVID. (1974). Presumptions and privileges are treated consistently in both the 
1974 Uniform Rules and the proposed federal rules as drafted by the Supreme Court. 
However, Congress treated presumptions and privileges differently in the federal rules as 
enacted. 
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though New Mexico later confonned its rules to the versions enacted 
by Congress. 269 
Probably the most striking aspect of codification is the way the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and the 1974 Unifonn Rules counterpart 
have "caught on" over the last ten years. As of June, 1982, only eight­
een states had adopted a version of the federal rules as their state evi­
dence code.270 In the ten years since the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts declined codification, that number has virtually 
doubled to thirty-four,271 including Utah, which already had a code 
based on the 1953 Unifonn Rules,272 and all the New England states, 
except Massachusetts and Connecticut. 273 In addition, a version of 
the federal rules governs proceedings in federal military courts274 and 
the Commonwealth of Puerto RicO.275 There is an effort underway to 
codify a federal-rules model in Alabama.276 New York, which de­
clined codification in the early 1980's, has revived its consideration of 
codification, although its current draft is based more on the fonnat 
than the content of the actual federal rules.277 Even New Jersey, 
269. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1319 nn.15-16. 
270. Internal Memorandum of the National Center for State Courts (June 2, 1982), 
cited in Healy, supra note 87, at 153 n.l3. 
271. ALASKA R. EVID. 101-1101; ARIZ. R. EVID. 101-1103; ARK. R. EVID. 101­
1102; COLO. R. EVID. 101-1103; DEL. R. EVID. 101-1103; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.101­
.958 (1979); HAW. R. EVID. 101-1102; IDAHO R. EVID. 101-1103; IOWA R. EVID. 101­
1103; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. 101-1103; ME. R. EVID. 101-1102; MICH. R. EVID. 101-1102; 
MINN. R. EVID. 101-1101; MISS. R. EVID. 101-1103; MONT. R. EvID. 100-1008; NEB. R. 
EVID. 27-101 to -1103; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 47.020-56.020 (1987); N.H. R. EVID. 100­
1103; N.M. R. EVID. 101-1102; N.C. R. EVID. 101-1102; N.D. R. EVID. 101-1103; OHIO 
R. EVID. 101-1103; OKLA. STAT. tit. xii, §§ 2101-3103 (1980 & Supp. 1992); OR. R. EVID. 
100-1008; R.I. R. EVID. 101-1008; S.D. R. EVID. 19.1.1-.18.8; TENN. R. EVID. 101-1008; 
TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 100-1008; UTAH R. EVID. 101-1103; VT. R. EVID. 101-1103; WASH. 
R. EVID. 101-1103; W. VA. R. EVID. 101-1102; WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 901.01-911.02 (1975 
& Supp. 1991); WYo. R. EVID. 101-1104. 
272. Compare UTAH R. EVID. 101-1103 (effective Sept. I, 1983) with UTAH R. 
EVID. 1-74. 
273. ME. R. EVID. 101-1102; N.H. R. EVID. 100-1103; R.I. R. EVID. 101-1008; VT. 
R. EVID. 101-1103. 
274. MILITARY R. EVID. 101-1103. 
275. P.R. R. EVID. 1-84. 
276. See Charles W. Gamble & Russell L. Sandidge, Around and Through the 
Thicket ofHearsay: Dispelling Myths. Exposing Impostors and Moving Toward the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 42 ALA. L. REV. 5 (1990). 
277. NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK (1991) (submitted to the 1991-92 Session of the Legislature by Gov­
ernor Mario M. Cuomo). In the letter of transmittal from the commission to the Gover­
nor, the commission emphasized that, unlike the 1982 proposed code, the 1991 version was 
less of an attempt to "conform state law to the federal rules" and "much more a New York 
Code of Evidence." Letter from Robert M. Pitler, a member of the commission, to Mario 
M. Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York at XXI (Mar. 21, 1991). Cj Bernard S. 
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which already has its own code,278 is considering a codification based 
upon federal rule enumeration, but retaining state substantive provi­
sions.279 Kentucky, which has no evidence code, has developed a tra­
dition of citing to and embracing individual federal rules of 
evidence.28o Illinois, which rejected a code in 1979,281 has also em­
braced individual federal rules from time to time.282 Furthermore, 
while beyond our current concerns, law reform bodies in many other 
countries are considering revising and codifying their evidence law.283 
Given the sheer number of federal and state courts now using a 
version of the federal rules, they have truly become "the majority 
view," even if no one would argue that they are perfect.284 However, 
to the extent that the federal rules have become the norm, there are 
significant variations from the norm. Three compendiums discuss 
these variations exhaustively,285 but some synthesis is possible. 
The first major variation is the mode of enactment. Of the thirty­
four codifying states, only nine codified their evidence law by stat­
ute.286 Twenty-five of those states, a substantial majority, including 
Meyer & Richard T. Farrell, The New York Proposed Code 0/Evidence: Some Background 
and Some Suggestions, 47 BROOK. L. REV. 1237 (1981). 
278. See supra discussion accompanying notes 247-49. 
279. Richard Pliskin, Federal Evidence Rules Are Model/or N.J. Plan, 129 N.J. L.J. 
Index Page 491 (1991). 
280. See April A. Kestel, Comment, The Kentucky Trend Toward the Federal Rules 
0/ Evidence: In Which Areas Will Kentucky Law Be Changed?, 7 N. Ky. L. REV. 189 
(1980). 
281. Letter from Joseph H. Goldenhersh, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Illinois, to Rex Carr, Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Evidence (Jan. 12, 1979). 
See also John Powers Crowley, Foreword: Illinois Evidence-The Question o/Codification, 
10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 297 (1979). 
282. See, e.g., Wilson v. Clark, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1326-27 (Ill.), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 836 (1981), in which the Supreme Court of Illinois expressly adopted Federal Rule 
703 and Federal Rule 705 on expert testimony without ever mentioning that it declined 
codification generally, just two years before. 
283. These countries include, inter alia, Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, 
and the United Kingdom. See William Twining, The New Evidence Scholarship: A Com­
ment on Christopher Finlayson's "Proving Your Case-Evidence and Procedure in Action," 
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 295, 299 & n.23 (1991). 
284. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FED­
ERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1991). 
285. Wroth's article, The Federal Rules 0/ Evidence in the States: A Ten-Year Per­
spective, was a magnificent effort to survey the actual enactments of the 30 states codifying 
evidence law as of 1985. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1320. GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STE­
PHEN A. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES 
(1987 & Supp. 1991), is an even more comprehensive and current treatment. 
Though purportedly a treatment of only "Uniform Rules" states, the National Confer­
ence does exhaustively cover both federal and uniform rule jurisdictions. See UNIF. R. 
EVID., reprinted in 13A U.L.A. (1986 & Supp. 1992). 
286. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1350 n.272. 
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four New England states, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont,287 codified by court rule.288 
The second major variation is the extent to which the codifying 
states have felt free to modify the "better-view" Federal or Uniform 
Rule model to conform to pre-existing state practice-a perceived 
"even-better-view."289 Many federal and/or uniform rules were 
adopted nearly verbatim by all codifying states.290 However, several 
commentators have noted that nearly two-thirds of the Supreme 
Court's 1972 proposed federal rules have been modified substantively 
in one or more of the adopting states.291 Apparently, only one adopt­
ing state, Utah, has made fewer than ten substantial changes, and even 
Utah has made five. 292 At least some states, whether by design or 
oversight, have not amended their own codes to reflect later amend­
ments to the federaP93 or uniform rules.294 And, of course, individual 
state acceptance or rejection in judicial opinions of federal or state ad­
visory committee interpretations can create more of such 
divergence.295 
The most significant substantive changes tend to revolve around 
the perennial "problem children" of presumptions and privileges.296 
With respect to presumptions, the states are all over the board. Begin­
ning with Rule 301, thirteen states, including New Hampshire and 
287. See supra note 273. For the interaction between the legislature and the judici­
ary in Vermont over the state's proposed codification, see Wroth, supra note 234, at 1350 
n.273. See John A. Dooley III, The Regulation of the Practice ofLaw, Practice and Proce­
dure, and Court Administration in Vermont-Judicial or Legislative Power?, 8 VT. L. REV. 
211, 220 n.51 (1983). 
288. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1350. Since the publication of Dean Wroth's article, 
four more states have codified by court rule. See LA. CODE EVID. ANN. 101-1103 (West 
1992); MISS. R. EVID. 101-1103; R.I. R. EVID. 100-1008; TENN. R. EVID. 101-1008. 
289. A detailed discussion of reasons for variation between the federal model and 
state enactments appears in Wroth, supra note 234, at 1322-24. 
290. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 602 ("Lack of Personal Knowledge"); UNIF. R. EVID. 
602 ("Lack of Personal Knowledge"); FED. R. EVID. 604 ("Interpreters"); UNIF. R. EVID. 
604 ("Interpreters"). See, e.g., 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, §§ 36.2, 38.2. 
291. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1322; Graham, supra note 234, at 308. 
292. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1322 n.43; Graham, supra note 234, at 308. 
293. Graham, supra note 234, at 307. 
294. A number of uniform rules were amended by the National Conference in 1986. 
,For a convenient summary, see the prefatory note to the 1986 amendments to the Uniform 
Rules of Evidence, reprinted in 13A U.L.A. (1986). 
295. See Graham, supra note 234, at 308. One example Professor Graham uses here 
is the variation among the states on the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures 
under Federal Rule 407 on liability issues in products liability cases, an issue that has vexed 
the federal circuit courts as well. Id. See Wendy Bugher Greenley, Note, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 407: New Controversy Besets the Admissibility ofSubsequent Remedial Measures, 
30 VILL. L. REV. 1611 (1985). 
296. See supra text accompanying notes 259-67. 
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Vermont, have adopted the federal rule, "Thayer view" of presump­
tions.297 However, twelve states, including Maine, have adopted a 
proposed federal rule, "Morgan view" of presumptions.298 Four, in­
cluding Rhode Island, have adopted detailed rules on presumptions, 
depending on the presumption involved.299 Five states have adopted 
no codified rules on presumptions.3°O One state even adopted a pre­
sumption rule that preserves existing presumption law.30 ! There is 
comparable confusion over Rules 302 and 303.302 
If the codifying states are all over the board regarding presump­
tions, they are all over the universe regarding privileges. Fourteen 
states have enacted Federal Rule SOlon privileges, thus leaving privi­
lege law to constitutional, statutory, and common-law recognition and 
development.303 Eighteen states, including Maine, New Hampshire, 
and Vermont, have enacted some version of Proposed Federal Rule 
501 (also the current Uniform Rule)304 which provides an exclusive 
"laundry list" of privileges and thus bars evolutionary common-law 
development of privilege.305 However, many of these latter states, in­
cluding New Hampshire and Vermont, have expanded or contracted, 
or deleted and replaced, the privileges on the laundry list,306 resulting 
in a "crazy quilt" of privilege rules from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
Two other codifying states have adopted no privilege rule whatso­
ever,307 with Rhode Island tersely expressing an unmistakable desire 
in Rule 501 of its code to avoid any modification or supersession of 
existing state privilege law.308 
Despite this diversity in the mode of enactment and substantive 
content of many supposedly "code" provisions, there is remarkably 
little modern scholarly opposition to codification of evidence law. 309 
297. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1327 n.70. 
298. Id. at 1327 n.71; 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, § 8.2. 
299. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1327 n.72; R.1. R. EVID. 301-07. 
300. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1327 n.73; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. 301-03 (re­
served) (West 1992); TENN. R. EVID. art. III (reserved). 
301. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1327 n.74; IOWA R. EVID. 301. 
302. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1327-29. 
303. 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, § 23.2. 
304. UNIF. R. EVID. 501 (1974). 
305. 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, § 23.2. 
306. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1334-36. 
307. 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, § 23.2. 
308. R.I. R. EVID. 501. 
309. The major piece opposing codification is Graham, supra note 234. Even Profes­
sor Graham, however, seems more ambivalent than opposed to codification, his ambiva­
lence growing from his pessimism on whether codification can ever achieve the goals set for 
it. Accord Younger, supra note 234, at 252-54. See also Richard S. Walinski & Howard 
Abramoff, The Proposed Ohio Rules ofEvidence: The Case Against, 28 CASE W. RES. L. 
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Scholarly review of codification tends to be favorable, whether viewed 
prospectively toward codification,310 concurrently with codification,311 
or retrospectively with the benefit of ten years of intra-jurisdiction ex­
perience under codification.312 Also, the fact remains that thirty-four 
states have substantially adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence as 
their state evidence law, and no state that has codified on a federal 
rules model has ever "decodified" (at least, not intentionally).313 The 
next section of this Article will argue why Massachusetts should re­
consider its decision not to codify its evidence law. 
IV. WHY MASSACHUSETIS SHOULD CODIFY 
A. Uniformity 
The first reason Massachusetts should codify its evidence law is to 
provide uniformity.314 Admittedly, uniformity is more important in 
the federal court system (where federal trial judges in different states 
otherwise might apply different evidence law)315 than for any given 
state court system (where presumably every trial judge is applying that 
state's evidence law). And it may seem odd given the diversity that 
exists between "codifications" based on the federal rules model to raise 
uniformity as a factor in codification at all.316 However, uniformity 
can be an advantage of codification without literal and total uniform-
REV. 344, 367-87 (1978) (arguing that increased admissibility coupled with enhanced trial 
court discretion does not automatically lead to better adjudications on the merits). 
310. Gamble & Sandidge, supra note 276, at 8. 
311. See, e.g., Field, supra note 236, at 224. 
312. Berger, supra note 234, at 264-69 (10 years of codification in federal court); 
Schmertz, supra note 234, at 1370-76 (10 years of codification in federal court); Whinery, 
supra note 234, at 194-96 (10 years of codification in the Oklahoma state courts). 
313. The somewhat embarrassing quasi-exception is Arkansas. One of the states that 
enacted a code by statute, Arkansas discovered 10 years later that its legislature was unlaw­
fully in session at the time the code was passed. Rather than risk chaos in its judicial 
system, the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted a codification as court rule to fill the gap. 
See Ricarte v. State, 717 S.W.2d 488 (Ark. 1986). 
314. Whinery, supra note 234, at 194. 
315. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 181. Indeed, "for the first 150 years of the 200­
year history of federal courts, things were the reverse of what they are today. Before 1938, 
the federal courts followed state procedural law and federal substantive law, even in diver­
sity cases." Baker, supra note 256, at 325-26. It is thus ironic that a major argument for a 
given state to codify its evidence law on a federal rules model is to regain the intrastate 
uniformity that existed prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
316. This "diversity of codification" deflates the argument that codification on a fed­
eral rules model could lead to the nationwide law of evidence being disproportionately 
influenced by the oligarchical few in charge of the federal rules, the fear being that the 
states would follow federal evidence law developments in a "sheep-like" manner. See Gra­
ham, supra note 234, at 297-98. 
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ity of language in every state and federal court.317 Even allowing for 
local variation, in nearly all the code jurisdictions there is now a con­
sistent format and organizational plan of evidence with identical or 
nearly identical numbering systems; typical substantive provisions in 
identical or nearly identical language; and agreement on the evidence 
topics that are to be included and excluded from the body of the code 
itself.318 This "relative" uniformity permits a more thorough analysis 
of already codified provisions319 without the wasteful "sorting and 
comparison of variant rules"320 across common-l;;tw jurisdictions. 
The failure of the codes to be exhaustively inclusive is not a death 
knell to uniformity. As one commentator has observed, "when we 
speak of the Federal Rules of Evidence and its state counterparts as a 
'code,' we are not using the term in the same sense ... as the Bank­
ruptcy Code, or the Internal Revenue Code, or even the Uniform 
Commercial Code."321 The evidence codes do not deal with every sit­
uation, and they contain standards rather than absolute rules.322 The 
focus tends to be on the most significant areas of admission of proof at 
trial as well as those most in need of clarification or reform,323 with the 
opportunity for judicial interpolation to fill any gaps.324 
When it declined to adopt the proposed Massachusetts rules, the 
Supreme Judicial Court recognized uniformity of practice in federal 
and state courts to be a "valid objective" of codification.325 While 
"uniformity" was not included within the code values of fairness, effi­
ciency, and progress,326 uniformity enhances all three values.327 Con­
sistency across the states tends to avoid the injustices created by 
primitive choice-of-Iaw rules in interstate evidence problems.328 It 
also eases the transition of lawyers from state to state.329 Uniformity 
317. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1322. 
31S. Id. at 134S. But see Younger, supra note 234, at 254 n.17 ("The prudence of 
uniformity of practice between federal and state courts is hardly self-evident. And if the 
[Federal] Rules were folly to begin with, their replication among the states would not make 
them wise. "). 
319. Tollison, supra note 234, at 57. 
320. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1349. 
321. Berger, supra note 234, at 255. 
322. Id. 
323. Schmertz, supra note 234, at 1373. 
324. For a thoughtful approach to filling such gaps, see id. at 1374-76. 
325. SJC Announcement, supra note I. 
326. FED. R. EVlD. 102 ("Purpose and Construction"). 
327. Graham, supra note 234, at 299-301. 

32S. Id. at 300 & n.25. 

329. See Schmertz, supra note 234, at 1370. There are those who challenge the im­
portance of this factor. See Graham, supra note 234, at 297. 
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benefits the attorney with clients in several different code states,330 a 
situation that occurs frequently in Massachusetts, given that all but 
one of the neighboring New England states is now a code 
jurisdiction.331 
Uniformity between federal and state courts within a state eases 
the transition of lawyers within the forum,332 and encourages attor­
neys to practice in both state and federal venues.333 While the diver­
sity of provisions across the code states might give rise to some fears of 
forum-shopping among the courts of different states,334 forum-shop­
ping on evidence issues between state and federal courts within the 
same state is unlikely for several reasons. First, most attorneys do not 
do their "shopping" based on the rules of evidence;335 rather, they 
shop based upon considerations of the predispositions of likely judges 
and the composition of typical jury panels. Second, uniformity of evi­
dence laws between state and federal courts in the same forum would 
discourage shopping by removing its incentives336 and at worst would 
not encourage shopping beyond what is already available.337 
As with many qualities that are difficult to quantify, however, the 
ultimate beauty of codifying evidence law on a federal rules model can 
be appreciated best by metaphor. Think of the common law as Latin, 
and the federal rules as English. Continued adherence to the common 
law in evidentiary matters is essentially adherence to a dead language, 
and the beauty of codification is that everyone would be speaking Eng­
lish, even if the "idioms" of the code from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
vary the way English does from Australia to Alabama. In fact, given 
the diversity within the codes nationwide, Massachusetts can choose 
its own code idioms within the basic organizational plan. 
330. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1322. 
331. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
332. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1322. At least one commentator doubts that many 
lawyers actually practice in both federal and state courts or that their impact on the rules 
would be very substantial. Graham, supra note 234, at 296. 
333. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 194 n.79; Tollison, supra note 234, at 62. 
334. 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, at v. 
335. Patrick, supra note 234, at 670. 
336. Tollison, supra note 234, at 57. 
337. "Erie nods" in Federal Rules of Evidence 302 ("Presumptions"), 501 ("Privi­
leges"), and 601 ("Competency of Witnesses") already discourage forum-shopping based 
on evidence considerations, because the federal courts look to the state view under these 
rules in diversity and supplemental subject matter jurisdiction cases, the most likely candi­
dates for forum-shopping. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1367 (1988). See supra text accompany­
ing notes 262, 267. However, the obvious differences between the federal rules and current 
Massachusetts practice would stiII offer possible considerations for the attorney who wished 
to forum-shop. See generally Hughes et aI., supra note 8. 
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Having conceded that Massachusetts can vary from the federal 
rules model, a reconsideration of codification for the commonwealth, 
sadly, must begin with a new proposed code. This is true for several 
reasons. First, the Supreme Judicial Court was correct in assaying 
that the 1980 Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence departed sig­
nificantly and controversially from their federal counterparts.338 A 
state code more closely patterned after the federal one is more sensi­
ble.339 Second, to the extent that Massachusetts would want to depart 
from the federal model on specific code provisions, the drafters of the 
proposed code did not have the benefit of comparing and evaluating 
the codes of three of the four now-codified New England states, be­
cause those three jurisdictions codified after the Supreme Judicial 
Court rejected the proposed Massachusetts rules in 1982.340 Further, 
two major compendiums of code jurisdictions nationwide would pro­
vide even more opportunities for comparison,341 through a "head 
count" of the codifying states on each evidence topic in the code. 342 
Third, there have been a number of amendments to, and interpreta­
tions of, both the federaP43 and uniform rules344 that any advisory 
committee drafting a new Massachusetts code would want to consider. 
For instance, any new advisory committee automatically should in­
clude one pervasive amendment to the federal rules, the "gender-neu­
tralization" changes. 345 Fourth, drafters would want to review a 
number of post-1980 decisions under Massachusetts common law, es­
pecially those dealing with the original proposed Massachusetts 
338. SJC Announcement, supra note 1. See also 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra 
note 285, at v ("It can matter, and matter a lot, which version of the Rules a state has 
adopted. "). 
339. Gamble & Sandidge, supra note 276, at 8; Tollison, supra note 234, at 62. In 
addition to the other advantages discussed, if Massachusetts had a code based on the fed­
eral rules, and a given Massachusetts rule of evidence were to be part of an appeal to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, the nation's highest Court would be hard-pressed to 
overturn on some constitutional ground a state court rule identical to its own federal rule 
on the issue. See Kestel, supra note 280, at 193. 
340. Although Maine codified in 1976, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island 
did not codify until 1983, 1985, and 1987, respectively. See 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 
MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXT, 1047-49 (1989). 
341. See JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285; Wroth, supra note 234. 
342. The Supreme Judicial Court used this "head-count" approach in evaluating 
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(I)(A) in the Daye case. See supra text accompany­
ing note 157; Commonwealth v. Daye, 469 N.E.2d 483,493 n.14 (Mass. 1984). 
343. See. e.g .• FED. R. EVID. 609(a) ("Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of 
Crime"); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (preserving the opportunity to impeach 
by bias even though no federal rule of evidence expressly permits such mode of 
impeachment). 
344. See supra note 294. 
345. See FED. R. EVID. 101-1103. 
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code.346 Presumably, any new advisory committee should be consti­
tuted with both continuity and diversity in mind.347 To avoid cita­
tional confusion with the earlier effort, a new codification might be 
designated the "Suggested Massachusetts Rules of Evidence." 
B. Rationality and Modernity 
Massachusetts also should codify its evidence law based on a fed­
eral rules model because of considerations of rationality and moder­
nity. Even if uniformity with practice in the federal courts alone is 
unpersuasive, Massachusetts should use the federal code as a model 
because it remains the most recent and thorough re-evaluation of the 
law of evidence.348 The Commonwealth already has modernized its 
rules of procedure based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,349 
and "rules of evidence are inextricably bound up with rules of proce­
dure."35o Accordingly, codifying using the federal evidence model 
would permit rational interlocking of already cross-referenced rules 
using similar language to mean similar things. Also, the basic premise 
underlying the federal evidence code "is that there should be a greater 
liberality in the admission of evidence."351 The premise is grounded 
on the greater educational and culturai understanding of modem ju­
rors when compared to their eighteenth century counterparts in Eng­
land.352 This should be especially true in Massachusetts, which uses 
the "one-day, one-trial" system for its juries,353 thereby assuring that 
virtually everyone, including judges and law professors,354 will be eli­
346. See generally supra text accompanying notes 98-233. 
347. Continuity would be advanced by including at least one member from the origi­
nal committee. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. Diversity would be ad­
vanced by considerations of gender, race, geography (both in the sense of the areas of the 
state and of size of municipality within the state), type of employment (government and 
private, academic and judicial), type of litigation practice (civil and crimina!), and perhaps 
other characteristics as well. See also Tollison, supra note 234, at 65-66 (suggestions on the 
composition of the advisory committee for Mississippi). 
348. Field, supra note 235, at 3 (quoting Spangenberg, The Federal Rules of Evi­
dence-An Attempt at Uniformity in Federal Courts, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1061, 1061 
(1969)). 
349. Hennessey, supra note 98, at 7. See MASS. R. CIV. P.; MASS. R. DOM. REL. P.; 
DIST./MUN. CTs. R. CIV. P. 
350. Tollison, supra note 234, at 53. 
351. Field, supra note 235; at 4. 
352. Id. 
353. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 234A, §§ 1-80 (1990). 
354. When the author of this Article was called for jury service in an attempted 
murder trial in Suffolk County (Boston), the trial judge asked the jury pool as a whole if 
anyone could not sit on the jury. I raised my hand, and at a bench conference the trial 
judge reminded me about the importance of everyone serving as a juror. He then asked for 
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gible for jury service. 
The codification of evidence law would help the Commonwealth 
jettison irrational practices based upon old precedents.355 Two prac­
tices in Massachusetts that fit this category are the rule that a party 
can impeach his or her own witnesses only by prior inconsistent state­
ment356 and the practice of allowing proponents of an otherwise inad­
missible document to offer the document into evidence when it is used 
to refresh a witness' memory and the opponent demands to see it.357 
Also, by codifying rationally, the court could avoid accidental, unde­
sired codification. 358 
As indicated earlier, however, a majority of the Supreme Judicial 
Court was concerned "that promulgation of rules of evidence would 
tend to restrict the development of common-law principles pertaining 
to the admission of evidence."359 Opponents of codification often raise 
this argument using Judge Henry Friendly's classic statement "[w]hen 
it is not necessary to do anything, it is necessary to do nothing."360 
However, the next natural question, which the Supreme Judicial Court 
did not ask, is: "What is the purpose of common-law development?" 
Presumably, that purpose is to modernize by reform those evidence 
rules which have become outdated. However, it is nearly impossible 
to modernize evidence law through common-law development.361 
Case law fails to keep pace with the thousands of practical problems of 
admissibility that arise each day in trials. 362 
The reasons for this failure are fairly simple. First, the common­
law system is subject to the vagaries of which cases get appealed. Liti­
gators tend to focus on the result in the case, not pressing or even 
preserving fine points of evidence law. 363 Second, even an ardent liti­
my excuse. I replied, "Your Honor, when the prosecutor was in law school, I taught him 
Evidence." Without batting an eye, the trial judge asked me, "How'd he do?" 
355. Whinery, supra note 234, at 195. 
356. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 23 (1990). See LIACOS, supra note 2, at 159-61. 
357. Leonard v. Taylor, 53 N.E.2d 705 (Mass. 1944). See LIACOS, supra note 2, at 
444-45. 
358. One expert commenting on possible codification in North Carolina noted that 
North Carolina hearsay law had been affected by the Federal Rules of Evidence even 
though the state had not yet codified and suggested that an evidence code would be needed 
in order to prevent unwelcome changes in existing state law. Walter J. Blakey, Moving 
Towards an Evidence Law of General Principles: Several Suggestions Concerning an Evi­
dence Code for North Carolina, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1,9-17 (1981). 
359. SJC Announcement, supra note 1. 
360. 120 CONGo REC. 1415 (1974) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman, quoting 
Judge Friendly). 
361. Field, supra note 235, at 2; Schmertz, supra note 234, at 1370. 
362. See Schmertz, supra note 234, at 1370. 
363. Field, supra note 235, at 2. 
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gator will recognize and abandon harmless error when he or she sees 
it.364 Third, trial judges are unlikely to depart from even old prece­
dents,365 thus compounding the first two problems. 
By contrast to the haphazard approach of the common law, codi­
fication can modernize evidence law immediately, comprehensively, 
and consistently.366 Indeed, one commentator believes that the best 
argument in favor of codification is its capacity to be a vehicle for the 
thorough reform of a jurisdiction's law of evidence.367 Even though 
some states that have codified their evidence law have chosen different 
treatment of an individual rule than the federal code, the codification 
effort itself forces rethinking of evidence concepts and consequently 
modernizes them. 368 
We also should be clear that codification is not the end of the 
process of analyzing evidence concepts, but rather a new beginning. 369 
Even a "modem" code will not be perfect, and even if perfect, could 
not stay perfect. As time goes on, courts will have to interpret ambi­
guities, challenge anachronisms, and perhaps suggest amendments to 
the code.370 The beauty of a code is that such problem areas tend to 
be highlighted rather quickly and clearly because everyone is studying 
and arguing the same code phrases. 
This is one aspect of codification as to which the Supreme Judi­
cial Court somewhat missed the point, as reflected by two of its state­
ments in the announcement declining to implement the proposed 
Massachusetts code. On the one hand, "some of the Justices [believed 
that] the Federal Rules of Evidence have not led to uniform practice in 
the various federal courtS."371 This is certainly true, in the sense that 
federal courts have disagreed on several issues not expressly dealt with 
m the code, such as whether the exclusion of subsequent remedial 
364. Patrick, supra note 234, at 673 (noting that the operation of the harmless error 
rule results in few reversals on points of evidence). 
365. Field, supra note 235, at 2. The author of that article went on to observe that 
"[ilt was a standard joke in Massachusetts, where the writer practiced for many years, to 
give the most credit in reform of evidence law to a judge who several times unintentionally 
failed to abide by precedent and then was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court." Id. at 
2 n.3. 
366. Id. at 2; Schmertz, supra note 234, at 1371. 
367. Patrick, supra note 234, at 670. 
368. Saitzburg, supra note 234, at 187. 
369. Tollison, supra note 234, at 66. 
370. See, for example, the discussion of possible amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence on the occasion of their tenth birthday in Berger, supra note 234, at 273 -76. One 
opponent of codification is less sanguine about the evolution of law under an evidentiary 
code system. See Graham, supra note 234, at 313 -14. 
371. SJC Announcement, supra note 1. 
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measures to prove liability as provided by Rule 407 applies in products 
liability cases. 372 However, it is precisely this focus on problem areas 
that has encouraged and guided several codifying states to include in 
their Rule 407 an express provision dealing with the products liability 
question.373 Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court's second statement, 
that "the Federal Rules ... are, in some instances, less well adapted to 
the needs of modem trial practice than current Massachusetts law,"374 
is also misplaced. If Massachusetts disagrees with the federal treat­
ment of a given evidence concept, then the Commonwealth should, 
and can, change that concept within the Massachusetts code. This 
rational kind of change can have greater ramifications than mere in­
trajurisdictional satisfaction. For example, a number of states inserted 
within their Rule 404(b) a provision that the proponent (usually the 
prosecutor in a criminal case) of prior bad acts evidence must give pre­
trial notice to the opponent of the intention to offer such evidence.375 
Effective December 1, 1991, a similar notice provision was inserted in 
the federal rule.376 Thus, the states that have codified can act not only 
for their own good but also as a "laboratory" for extrajurisdictional 
guidance as well. 377 
This "laboratory" perspective is an important one. Jurisdictions 
considering a codification based primarily on their own existing law of 
evidence (currently, New Jersey and New York)378 do not risk merely 
restating their evidence law instead of reforming it. Those jurisdic­
tions deprive themselves of participating in the nationwide experimen­
tation under federal model codes and therefore risk dooming 
themselves to evidential eccentricity and eventual irrelevance nation­
ally. By contrast, the states codifying based on a federal rules model 
enjoy the opportunity to consult the similarly structured jurisprudence 
of other codifying states and the federal courts as well.379 The "fed­
372. See Berger, supra note 234, at 265-66. 
373. Maine and Rhode Island reversed the federal rule by admitting evidence of sub­
sequent remedial measures in virtually all cases. However, six states that follow the policy 
of the federal rule have "express" provisions for products liability cases; Alaska, Hawaii, 
Iowa, and Texas admit such measures, while Nebraska and Tennessee exclude them. See 1 
JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, § 17.2. 
374. SJC Announcement, supra note 1. 
375. 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, § 14.2 n.6. The states are Florida, 
Tennessee, and Texas (the last in criminal cases only). The approaches to the "notice" 
issue of several other states are gathered in Graham, supra note 234, at 309. 
376. H.R. Doc. No. 102-76, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
377. 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, at iv-v. 
378. See supra text accompanying notes 277-79. 
379. Tollison, supra note 234, at 54-55. But see Graham, supra note 234, at 313 
("One sees in the state court opinions a slight but gradually increasing tendency to cite the 
46 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1 
eral-rules-as-model" is not just the coming thing; as the evidence foun­
dation for thirty-four states, it is the "arrived" thing. Massachusetts, 
with no homegrown codification and no plans for one, will benefit 
most by joining the interstate federation of laboratories on a federal­
rules model as soon as possible. 
C. Accessibility and Competency 
Massachusetts should codify for reasons of accessibility and com­
petency as well. The code advantage of accessibility is recognized by 
skeptics,380 and even opponents,381 of codification. A commcmtator on 
one state's ten-year experience with an evidence code believes that ac­
cessibility is "perhaps the greatest virtue" of codification.382 
The major problem of accessibility in common-law states like 
Massachusetts is that the "law" of evidence is scattered throughout 
dozens of volumes of statutes and hundreds of volumes of reporters.383 
It is, quite simply, very difficult for attorneys and judges to "find" 
evidence law in a common-law jurisdiction.384 By comparison, the 
federal rules, by reducing most of the law of evidence to a single docu­
ment, has provided a "clearly lit landscape" for participants in litiga­
tion.385 The eleven articles of a federal rules code are an integrated 
system, so that the answer to an evidence question often lies in a rela­
tively easy interplay of several different rules.386 Even if an evidence 
issue is not covered in the code, at least all participants can discover 
this and research accordingly. 387 
Accessibility also enhances lawyer competency. By express 
Supreme Judicial Court rule, attorneys in Massachusetts are charged 
federal case law in construing state versions of the Federal Rules-but very little citation of 
the cases and statutes of other states."). However, in that same 1990 article, the commen­
tator suggests that a possible reason for the relative lack of State A's citation to State B's 
code is the absence of State B's evidence materials from State A's libraries. Id. at 313. 
Given that the Wroth compendium was published only five years before the commentator's 
article, and the more comprehensive compendium by Joseph and Saltzburg only three years 
prior, it is hoped that more and more "State A's" will have access to, and desire to benefit 
from, "State B's" evidence code materials. See supra notes 234-85. 
380. See Younger, supra note 234, at 254. 
381. See Graham, supra note 234, at 312-13. 
382. Whinery, supra note 234, at 255. 
383. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 234, at 283; Field, supra note 235, at 2; Patrick, 
supra note 234, at 669; Whinery, supra note 234, at 195. 
384. Berger, supra note 234, at 261; Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 192. But see 
HUGHES, supra note 2 (1992 Supplement attempts to organize existing Massachusetts evi­
dence law within a code format). 
385. Younger, supra note 234, at 254. 
386. Patrick, supra note 234, at 674. 
387. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 184 n.48. 
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to act competently in cases they handle.388 Under the format of a fed­
eral rules model, the attorney knows where to look for an evidence 
concept. This is the case even if the actual content of the rule is differ­
ent from the federal version.389 Regardless of whether the "better" 
view is to admit or exclude a given piece of evidence, a code is the best 
place to make that decision and to make it with clarity.390 
In addition to easy accessibility pre-trial, the code also provides 
the litigator with that vital, quick accessibility to an evidentiary rule 
during a trial or other proceeding. This is the so-called "pocket bi­
ble"391 advantage, praised by some392 and questioned by others.393 
Obviously, detailed research and motions in limine might produce a 
"perfect" evidentiary trial. However, the beauty of the pocket bible is 
that during the heat of a contested hearing on an unanticipated issue 
of evidence law, many variables can be eliminated and more "correct" 
trial-level rulings are likely.394 This should enhance not only the ac­
tual competence of lawyers in the courtroom, but also the equally im­
portant aspect of apparent competence of lawyers in the one venue in 
which the general public sees the law presented.395 
A code of evidence based on the federal rules also enhances law­
yer competency by allowing attorneys to understand an evidence con­
cept once it is found. All litigators will be starting their evidence 
arguments using the same black-letter rules. 396 Furthermore, most at­
388. MASS. S.J.C. R. 3:07, DR 6-101. 
389. Graham, supra note 234, at 312-13. 
390. Cf Berger, supra note 234, at 265-67. 
391. Tollison, supra note 234, at 56. 
392. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 184. 
393. Graham, supra note 234, at 314. One danger of the "pocket bible" approach is 
that attorneys may tend to rely on the code itself and fail to keep abreast of the case law 
interpreting it. While this is a danger for codes in any area of the law, the same danger 
exists for the lawyer practicing in a common-law evidence state who fails to Shepardize a 
common-law precedent. 
394. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 184. 
395. Healy, supra note 87, at 153; Tollison, supra note 234, at 57. 
In judging the law's handling of its tasks of fact-finding in the [trial] setting, it is 
necessary always to bear in mind that this is a last ditch process in which some­
thing more is at stake than truth only of a specific matter in contest. There is at 
stake also that confidence of the public generally in the impartiality and the fair­
ness of public settlement of disputes which is essential if the ditch is to be held 
and the settlements accepted peaceably. 
HENRY M. HART, JR. & JOHN T. McNAUGHTON, Evidence and Inference in the Law, 
87(4) DAEDALUS 40, 45 (1958). 
This concern with the appearance of lawyer competency can only increase as the tele­
vising of trials, including those taking place in Massachusetts, becomes more pervasive. See 
Dick Dahl, Cable Goes to Court, 20 MASS. LAW. WKLY. 1229 (1992). 
396. See Berger, supra note 234, at 260-61; Tollison, supra note 234, at 57. 
48 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1 
torneys in the commonwealth entered practice after 1975, the effective 
date of the federal rules.397 Upon publication in the late 1960's, the 
preliminary drafts of the proposed federal rules "overnight ... super­
seded the Model Code and 1953 Uniform Rules as teaching tools."398 
By 1978, law schools were using the federal rules more and more,399 
and by 1984, virtually all evidence casebooks used the federal rules as 
"a point of departure,"400 a condition which persists today.401 Ac­
cordingly, most attorneys now in practice were "brought up" using 
the federal rules as the law of evidence, and in not too many more 
years the same will be true of most judges. 
Once found and understood, a code also contributes to compe­
tency by allowing the attorney to update the applicable code provision 
relatively easily. Law review surveys on evidence law from code juris­
dictions are more easily scanned and digested than those from com­
mon-law states.402 Even in the absence of such surveys, computerized 
legal research makes updating a rule with a given designation much 
easier than linking "buzz words" under an amorphous common-law 
397. There were approximately 45,000 attorneys registered in Massachusetts as of 
March, 1992. Telephone interview, Board of Bar Overseers, Registration Division (Mar. 5, 
1992). The board does not maintain statistical records of how many practitioners qualified 
after certain dates. However, the writer was admitted to the Massachusetts bar in January, 
1974, and remembers its total size as being approximately 20,000 members in the mid­
1970's. Therefore, most of today's 45,000 Massachusetts attorneys were admitted to the 
bar after the federal rules became effective on July 1, 1975. Nationwide, more than 50% 
of 1984's lawyers had been admitted to the bar since 1975. See Berger, supra note 234, at 
257. 
398. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1318. 
399. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 185-86. 
400. Berger, supra note 234, at 257. 
401. See, e.g., RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES (3d ed. 
1991); MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS, PROBLEMS 
(2d ed. 1989); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER 
THE RULES (1988). 
The writer is also informed by his colleagues who teach courses other than Evidence, 
both in Massachusetts and elsewhere, that they must make use of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence when evidentiary issues arise in their courses simply because many of them at­
tended law school or practiced law outside of their current state. They can rely on the 
federal rules being taught in virtually all law schools, including the ones at which they 
currently teach. 
402. With all respect to the following authors, compare, for example, Dale A. Brus­
chi, Evidence, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1131 (1991) (Florida, a code state), and James A. Adams, 
Admissibility of Proof of an Assault Victim's Specific Instances of Conduct as an Essential 
Element ofa Self-Defense Claim Under Iowa Rule ofEvidence 405,39 DRAKE L. REV. 401 
(1989-90) (Iowa, a code state), with Robert V. Dewey, Jr. & Stephen J. Heine, Survey of 
Illinois Law-Evidence, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 997 (1991) (Illinois, a common-law state), and 
Mlfc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERCER L. REV. 223 (1990) (Georgia, a common-law 
st~te). 
49 1993] CODIFICATION OF EVIDENCE LAW 
concept.403 Also, for those practitioners who are not "computer-liter­
ate," Shepard's Evidence Citations performs the same function, albeit 
more slowly, for an adopted code,404 an advantage even the proposed 
Massachusetts rules cannot offer.4OS Further, a code of evidence oper­
ative in State A is usually annotated and thus usually can be found 
both in State A and in State B.406 However, often a treatise on evi­
dence from a common-law jurisdiction is not available in the libraries 
of other states,407 and even if an extensive treatise of the common law 
of State A is available in the libraries of both State A and State B, that 
treatise may be awkwardly out-of-date.408 Indeed, one can argue that 
when the federal court in Siguel 409 "missed" the Supreme Judicial 
Court's decision in Ruszcyk,410 it was not because the Massachusetts 
court adopted a Proposed Massachusetts Rule of Evidence, but rather 
because that adoption could not easily be found by a federal court 
given the Massachusetts common-law system of evidence. A concur­
rent advantage to Massachusetts codifying on a federal-rules model is 
that the commonwealth's evidence law would be included in the major 
compendiums of code states411 and thus be available to all, both inside 
and outside Massachusetts. 
D. Certainty and Flexibility 
Finally, Massachusetts should codify its evidence law for reasons 
of certainty and ftexibility.412 At first it would seem that these two 
aspects of the admission of evidence are antithetical. After all, more 
certainty for litigators in the admissibility of evidence would mean less 
403. See, for example, the WESTLAW explanation of computer updating for a given 
federal rule of evidence in HUGHES, supra note 2, at VIII-IX. 
404. See. e.g., SHEPARD'S EVIDENCE CITATIONS (1991). 
405. SHEPARD'S does not "pick up" the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence, 
apparently because the proJXY;OO rules were never enacted. See. e.g., the citations to "Mas­
sachUsetts Court Rules" in SHEPARD'S MASSACHUSETTS CITATIONS, STATUTE EDmON 
859-92 passim (6th ed. 1986) (no references to the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of 
Evidence). 
406. A compendium such as the one by Joseph and Saltzburg could prove to be 
helpful in this respect. See supra note 285. 
407. Graham, supra note 234, at 313. 
408. This is the situation with the traditional "bible" for Massachusetts evidence 
law, PAUL J. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1981 & Supp. 
1985). The principal volume is 11 years old, and the most recent supplement is seven years 
old. 
409. See supra text accompanying notes 220-29. 
410. See supra text accompanying notes 173-86. 
411. For example, Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Tennessee have all recently codified 
and have been included in the compendium by Joseph and Saltzburg. See supra note 285. 
412. Whinery, supra note 234, at 196-97. 
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flexibility for trial judges in ruling on evidence, while more flexibility 
for trial judges in ruling on evidence would mean less certainty for 
litigators in the admissibility of evidence. However, in a code context, 
certainty and flexibility in fact work together symbiotically. 
It is demonstrably clear that codification enhances certainty in 
evidentiary rulings.413 As already discussed, a code requires all par­
ticipants to start from the same black-letter rules,414 thus encouraging 
a marshalling of arguments and facts head-to-head and avoiding the 
frequent, common-law sensation of ships passing in the night. An ad­
vocate armed with a black-letter rule is much better positioned to en­
lighten an inexperienced trial judge. The nightmare of the inconsistent 
or idiosyncratic trial judge is noted almost universally as a problem in 
common-law jurisdictions.41s However, to some extent that 
nightmare, while real, is not the individual jUrist's fault. After all, 
without a code, and perhaps only decades-old, vague precedents to 
guide him or her, it is no wonder that a trial judge would idiosyncrati­
cally develop a set of his or her "own" rules.416 These idiosyncracies 
are relatively easy to "hide" under a common-law system due to the 
harmless error doctrine and the relatively unsupervised exercise of dis­
cretion.417 However, any such idiosyncracy rapidly dissipates under 
codification, where there is no question what the "rule" of evidence on 
most given points actually "is." Motions in limine will be needed less 
frequently, but when brought can be more directly focused. This cer­
tainty of rule also substantially ameliorates the "equal protection" 
problem of litigants having the admissibility of their evidence, and 
therefore the outcome of their case, depend upon which judge they 
draw.418 The trial judge who stubbornly insists upon imposing his or 
her own regime despite codification can be quickly and clearly identi­
fied by the express code mandates he or she fails to honor, and thus 
can be "rechanneled" into code compliance on appea1.419 It will take 
some time to adjust to codification, during which time there may be an 
increase in litigation on evidentiary questions.42o On the whole, how­
ever, the trial courts should be able to avoid time-sapping wrangling 
413. Patrick, supra note 234, at 669-70. 
414. See supra text accompanying note 396. 
415. Schmertz, supra note 234, at 1370; Tollison, supra note 234, at SO. 
416. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 189. 
417. Patrick, supra note 234, at 673. 
418. Tollison, supra note 234, at SO. 
419. "Rules of court have the force of law and may not be disregarded by an individ­
ual judge." Empire Apartments, Inc. v. Gray, 231 N.E.2d 361, 364 (Mass. 1967). 
420. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 187. 
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over code-covered evidence oiferings,421 and the appellate system will 
be burdened less by unnecessary appeals.422 
Certainty also produces better advice to clients.423 The more pre­
dictable the trial jUdge's-any trial judge's-eventual ruling can be, 
the more accurate will be the litigator's assessment of the trial result. 
Therefore, settlements under a code will tend to be "better"424 (i.e., 
more reflective of the actual result should the case be tried to judg­
ment), and alternative dispute resolution options will be more likely 
vehicles for determination without a formal trial. 425 
However, certainty under a code system does not put the trial 
judge in a straitjacket. In much the same way that the code allows 
more evidence to be heard by the modem, more educated juror, the 
code also provides the modem trial judge with substantial discre­
tion,426 often more discretion than under parallel common-law sys­
tems. The difference is that the trial judge in a code state is usually 
given more guidelines for his or her discretion427 and is frequently re­
quired to provide reasons for exercising that discretion,428 thereby en­
suring a more informed set of litigators at the trial level and a sharper, 
more defined record on appeal.429 While difficult to substantiate sta­
tistically, "the general sense seems to be that the [federal r]utes' prefer­
ence for flexibility ... worked well over [its first] decade in the federal 
421. Id.; Tollison, supra note 234, at SO. 
422. Tollison, supra note 234, at S6. After a decade of experience under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, a sampling of appealed cases showed very few reversals occurring at the 
appellate level on evidentiary grounds. See Berger, supra note 234, at 264. 
423. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 187; Tollison, supra note 234, at SS. 
424. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 188; Tollison, supra note 234, at SS. 
42S. Alternative dispute resolution options have become more important for both 
cases under "Time Standards" and cases which predate the imposition of time standards. 
See, e.g., Mark Mason, Bills Would Expand Use 0/ADR in State Courts, 20 MASS. LAW. 
WKLY. 1021 (1992); Susan R. Boyle, Suffolk Begins Construction ADR Program, 20 MASS. 
LAW. WKLY. 829 (1992); Rouse Repons Reduction in Backlog, 20 MASS. LAW. WKLY. 860 
(1992). 
Massachusetts also must weigh the far-reaching impact of the recent trial court unifi­
cation proposal. See HARBRIDGE HOUSE, INC., JUSTICE ENDANGERED: A MANAGE­
MENT STUDY OF THE MASSACHUSETrS TRIAL CoURT (1991) (final report prepared for the 
Coalition for the Courts, Apr. 16, 1991). No bill involving the unification proposal was 
enacted during the 1991 legislative session. Barbara Rabinovitz, Compo Gets Overhaul. But 
Courts Untouched, 20 MAss. LAW. WKLY. 697 (1992). However, should any such bill be 
passed this year, the need for a standardized code of evidence and alternative dispute reso­
lution options may become crucial to the ability of unified courts to function. 
426. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 190. 
427. Patrick, supra note 234. at 673. See the extensive lists of discretionary rules 
with their guidelines in Field, supra note 236, at 207 n.24 (Maine Rules of Evidence), and 
in Healy. supra note 87, at IS3 n.9 (Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence). 
428. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 190. 
429. See Field, supra note 23S, at S. 
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courtS."430 There seems to be no reason to believe the carefully se­
lected431 trial judges in Massachusetts would not also use this flexibil­
ity wisely. 
The above arguments on uniformity, rationality and modernity, 
accessibility and competence, and certainty and flexibility make a 
compelling case for codification. Even if still resistant, however, any 
opponents of codification must deal with one unavoidable reality of 
litigation life: even in a common-law jurisdiction, every participant in 
the trial process does use a "code." The problem is, that we all use 
different codes.432 Some use the federal rules, others use the proposed 
Massachusetts rules. Some turn to a persuasive but not controlling 
outside treatise, others use a comprehensive but outdated in-state trea­
tise. Still others rely dangerously on terse and often test-oriented bar 
review materials or evidence class outlines. The bottom line is that all 
of us need a code, something to turn to for evidentiary guidance, and 
the importance of all of us using the same code, based on a format 
shared by thirty-four sister states and the entire federal system, seems 
obvious. 
V. REMAINING ISSUES TOWARD CODIFICATION 
A. Promulgation by Judiciary or Legislature 
As indicated above,433 a new advisory committee will have to 
draft a new code for Massachusetts. Presumably such a committee 
should be appointed by the branch of state government that will pro­
mulgate the new code. The question thus becomes whether the judici­
ary or the legislature should be that promulgating body. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence, though originally suggested by 
the United States Supreme Court, were eventually enacted into law as 
a statute by the Congress.434 The federal rules are also the basis of the 
Uniform Code of Evidence, promulgated by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.43S Since this is the case, 
430. Berger, supra note 234, at 270. 
431. There have been concerns expressed about ceding expanded discretion in the 
admission or exclusion of evidence to elected trial judges. See id. at 263. Given the elabo­
rate nomination process (through the Judicial Nominating Committee and the Governor's 
Office) and confirmation process (through the Governor's Council) in Massachusetts for its 
appointed trial judges, this should not be a problem. See MASS. CONST. pi. 2, ch. 2, § 3, 
art. 1. 
432. Healy, supra note 87, at 153. 
433. See supra text accompanying notes 338-47. 
434. See supra text accompanying notes 253-58. 
435. See supra text accompanying notes 268, 294. 
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Massachusetts could adopt the federal rules in the same way it has 
adopted other uniform laws.436 Nationally, nine states, a significant 
minority, have codified through legislative enactment.437 However, 
the remaining twenty-five code states have codified by court rule,438 
including the four codifying New England states.439 It is now recog­
nized that the judicial branches of both the federal and state govern­
ments possess general rulemaking power over evidence that is 
concurrent with, if not exclusive of, the legislative branches.440 A sec­
ond question, though, is whether particular rules of evidence intrude 
upon extrinsic policy issues, thus raising a separation of powers issue 
under state constitutions.441 
In its announcement declining codification, the Supreme Judicial 
Court made in passing two somewhat inconsistent statements bearing 
on this issue. On the one hand, there was concern that if the proposed 
Massachusetts rules were adopted, "there would have to be careful 
coordination with the Legislature to repeal, revise, or modify many 
statutes which deal with the admissibility and effect of evidence."442 
On the other hand, however, the court noted "the continued and his­
toric role of the courts in developing principles of law relating to evi­
dence."443 Which branch of the commonwealth's government is the 
appropriate branch to codify its law of evidence? 
The answer is not clear from the express provisions of the state 
constitution itself. Under the separation of governmental depart­
ments, the constitution provides that "the legislative department shall 
never exercise the ... judicial powers ... [and] the judicia[ry] shall 
never exercise the legislative ... powers."444 However, in the section 
of the constitution dealing with the judicial power, there is no mention 
of rulemaking by the court.44S Under the legislative power, there is 
436. Massachusetts has adopted by statute numerous unifoqn laws suggested by the 
National Conference, including the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Contribution 
Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, the Uniform Arbitration Act, and the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 106, § 1-101 to 9-507 (1990 & Supp. 1991) 
(adopting the Uniform Commercial Code); ch. 231B, §§ 1-4 (adopting the Uniform Contri­
bution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act); ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (adopting the Uniform Arbitration 
Act); ch. 109A, §§ 1-13 (adopting the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act). 
437. See supra text accompanying note 286. 
438. See supra text accompanying note 288. 
439. See supra text accompanying note 287. 
440. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1351. 
441. Id. at 1351-54. 
442. SJC Announcement, supra note 1 (emphasis added). 
443. Id. (emphasis added). 
444. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 30. 
445. See id. pt. 2, ch. 3, arts. 1-5. 
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express authority in the legislature to "erect and constitute ... courts 
... for the hearing, trying, and determining of all ... crimes ... causes 
and things."446 And the legislature is also given the authority to enact 
"all manner of wholesome and reasonable ... laws ... , not repugnant 
or contrary to this constitution, . . . for the good and welfare of this 
commonwealth,"447 including "new laws, as the common good may 
require."448 The legislature certainly has enacted numerous "new" ev­
idence statutes, mostly in the areas of presumptions,449 privileges,450 
and hearsay exceptions,451 but in other areas as well.452 
By general statute, the state legislature also has granted rulemak­
ing authority to the Supreme Judicial Court for the superintendence of 
inferior courts, including the power to "issue such ... rules as may be 
necessary or desirable for the furtherance of justice ... [and] the im­
provement of administration of such courtS."453 Again, by general 
statute, the legislature has granted rulemaking authority to the 
Supreme Judicial and Massachusetts Superior Courts to "promulgate 
uniform codes of rules, consistent with law, for regulating the practice 
... of such courts in cases not expressly provided for by law, for the 
following purpose[]: . . . [c]onducting trials. "454 
It thus would seem that the court's rulemaking authority is de­
rived only through statutes enacted by the legislature under the latter's 
constitutional authority. However, the Supreme Judicial Court has 
held that although the court's inherent powers may be recognized by 
statute, they exist without statutory authorization and cannot be re­
stricted or abolished by the legislature without violating constitutional 
provisions governing separation of powers.455 While steering clear of 
clashes over separation of powers in the evidence area,456 the court 
446. Id. pt. 2, ch. I, § I, art. 3. 
447. Id. pt. 2, ch. I, § I, art. 4. 
448. Id. pt. I, art. 22. 
449. See, for example, the hundreds of statutory presumptions under "Evidence-­
Presumptions" in MASS. GEN. L. 1991 GENERAL INDEX, D-I, at 258-59 (1991). 
450. See. e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 20 (1990) (spousal testimonial privilege); id. 
§ 20A (priest/penitent privilege); id. § 20B (patient/psychotherapist privilege); id. § 20J 
(sexual assault victim/counselor privilege). 
451. See. e.g., id. §§ 65-66 (certain statements of deceased persons); id. § 78 (certain 
business records); id. § 79 (certain hospital records). 
452. See. e.g., id. § 20 (incompetency of certain children to testify against their par­
ents); id. § 21 (impeachment of witness by prior criminal conviction); id. § 79A (authenti­
cation of certain public records). 
453. Id. ch. 211, § 3. 
454. Id. ch. 213, § 3. 
455. Brach v. Chief Justice of Dist. Court Dep't, 437 N.E.2d 164 (Mass. 1982) (inter­
preting Article 30 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution). 
456. See, e.g., Petition for the Promulgation of Rules Regarding Protection of Confi­
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also has held that an express grant of power in the state constitution to 
one branch of government "necessarily controls over the more general 
provisions of" the separation of powers article.457 
Most of the commentators have stated a preference for judicial 
rather than legislative promulgation of a codified system of evi­
dence.458 This preference is generally based upon the fact that judges 
have more expertise regarding appropriate admission and exclusion of 
evidence, more flexibility in drafting procedures, and a more amenable 
amendment process than their legislative counterparts.459 There also 
have been predictable difficulties in both the legislative enactment and 
the judicial interpretation of statutory evidence codes.460 
Not surprisingly, in a number of states, even in New England,461 
conflicts have arisen between the legislative and judicial branches re­
garding rulemaking authority,462 including the adoption of an evi­
dence code.463 However, there also have been some instances of 
remarkable cooperation between branches, especially with respect to 
the effect of inconsistent evidence rules contained in prior law464 once 
codification occurs.465 
Cooperation also should be possible in Massachusetts.466 The ar­
eas of evidence law regarding presumptions and privileges are proba­
bly the areas in which the legislature would most resent court 
intrusion, as both areas involve policy issues extrinsic to the trial pro­
cess. Given the traditionally active involvement of the legislature in 
each area, the Supreme Judicial Court might defer to that branch in 
dential News Sources, 479 N.E.2d 154, 156 (Mass. 1985) ("We do not address the question 
whether this court has the power to promulgate a rule creating a [news] reporter's privilege 
... [because] we conclude that, even if this court does have the power ... , it should not be 
exercised in the present circumstance."). 
457. Barnes v. Secretary of Admin., 586 N.E.2d 958, 961 (Mass. 1992). 
458. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1354; Tollison, supra note 234, at 65. 
459. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1354. 
460. See Whinery, supra note 234, at 204-08 (relating Oklahoma's experience). 
461. See supra note 287. 
462. See, e.g., Wroth, supra note 234, at 1349 n.265. 
463. See Paul Giannelli, The Proposed Ohio Rules ofEvidence: The General Assem­
bly, Evidence, and Rulemaking, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 16,24-27 (1978). 
464. See generally JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285. 
465. In Maine, for example, the state legislature authorized the state's highest court 
to prescribe rules of evidence, thus avoiding any doubt about the applicability of prior, 
more general rule-enabling acts and superseding all laws in conflict with such prescribed 
rules. Field, supra note 236, at 203 nn.6-7. 
466. For a "model" of judicial/legislative cooperation in the enactment of a code of 
evidence, see Wroth, supra note 234, at 1354-66. 
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both areas. 467 
Regarding presumptions, the original Proposed Massachusetts 
Rules attempted a detailed approach to presumptions which varied 
radically from the federal rule and redefined presumption-like con­
cepts from existing Massachusetts law.468 A better approach for a new 
advisory committee might be to follow the federal rule more closely,469 
but to consult with appropriate legislative committee chairpeople re­
garding the level of sensitivity legislators have toward preserving ex­
isting statutory concepts. The advisory committee also could explore 
the divergent approaches to presumptions of other codifying states,470 
since the divergence over the actual content of presumption rules in 
codifying states has already punctured any substantive "uniformity" 
in the presumption area nationwide. 
Since the approach of the codifying states is similarly diver­
gent,471 there is similar freedom for a new advisory committee devel­
oping privilege rules. However, Massachusetts privileges, except for 
attorney-client,472 historically have been a matter of legislative rather 
than judicial creation.473 The Supreme Iudicial Court has tended to 
defer to the legislature on matters of privilege474 and disqualification 
(even where it disagrees with the policy decision involved)47S and 
therefore tends to decline the opportunity to create new privileges by 
467. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1365. Tennessee, which codified the rules of evidence 
effective January I, 1990, followed this approach. See Banks, supra note 234, at 295, 335. 
468. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28. 
469. See supra text accompanying notes 259-63. 
470. See supra text accompanying notes 297-302. 
471. See supra text accompanying notes 303-08. 
472. See LIACOS, supra note 2, at 182-86. 
473. See. e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 112, § 135 (1990) ("Social Worker-Client Privi­
lege"); id. ch. 233, § 20A ("Priest-Penitent Privilege"); id. § 20B ("Patient-Psychotherapist 
Privilege"). 
474. See. e.g., Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1205-06 (Mass. 
1983) (stating that while "[w]e are, of course, free to identify a privilege of a child not to 
testify against his or her parent ... , courts have tended to leave the creation of evidentiary 
privileges to legislative determination"), cen. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984). The legislature 
did thereafter adopt a limited parent-child testimonial disqualification. See MASS. GEN. L. 
ch. 233, § 20 (1990) (as added by 1986 Mass. Acts 145). See a/so Petition for the Promul­
gation of Rules Regarding Protection of Confidential News Sources, 479 N.E.2d 154, 157 
(Mass. 1985) (deferring to legislature on a reporter's privilege rule). 
While codification often results in the restatement of existing privileges, several com­
mentators believe the expansion of privilege rules is particularly appropriate for the legisla­
ture, since the expansion of privilege tends to restrict the jury's access to otherwise relevant 
evidence for a policy reason generally extrinsic to any individual piece of litigation. See 
Field, supra note 236, at 213; Tollison, supra note 234, at 61. 
475. See, e.g., Gallagher V. Goldstein, 524 N.E.2d 53, 54-55 (Mass. 1988) (comment­
ing on Massachusetts statute prohibiting admission into evidence of contents of private 
marital communication). 
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common-law development.476 Federal Rule of Evidence 501 encom­
passes deference to the legislature while retaining for the jUdiciary the 
power, but not the mandate, to evolve individual privileges by com­
mon-law development. Thus, the actual federal rule approach,477 fol­
lowed by fourteen other codifying states,478 may make sense here.479 
One would hope that the Massachusetts legislature and court 
could avoid the unseemly "showdown" over separation of powers 
which marred the federal rules project in the early 1970's.480 While 
the Supreme Judicial Court was concerned in its declination of the 
proposed Massachusetts rules about the "careful coordination" needed 
with the legislature over pre-existing evidence provisions, a parallel 
need for careful coordination certainly did not stop the movement to 
adopt a federal rules based model for the state's civil procedure sys­
tem. Indeed, that movement resulted in a "coordinated" statute that 
covered literally hundreds of pre-existing provisions.481 The same cre­
ative and cooperative spirit between branches of government should be 
observed with the codification of evidence in Massachusetts.482 
B. Public Notice 
If codification occurs via the legislative process, the product is, by 
definition, the will of the people who elected those legislators. How­
ever, if codification occurs primarily through judicial rulemaking in a 
jurisdiction like Massachusetts, which appoints rather than elects its 
judges, concerns may arise that the process was "counter­
majoritarian."483 The composition of the advisory committee can 
ameliorate this concern somewhat.484 In addition, any set of suggested 
rules should be published both in the lawyers' newspaper485 and also 
in the official Massachusetts Reporter,486 so that the suggested rules 
476. See, e.g., Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1983), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984). 
477. See supra text accompanying notes 264-67. 
478. See supra text accompanying note 303. 
479. But see Patrick, supra note 234, at 690 (noting that "[c]odifying the rules of 
privilege would make them readily accessible and easily ascertainable ... [and] would 
provide an opportunity for reform of certain privilege rules"). 
480. See supra text accompanying notes 250-58. 
481. See 1973 Mass. Acts 1114, §§ 1-351 (approved Nov. 3D, 1973; effective July I, 
1974 by § 351). 
482. Tollison, supra note 234, at 63; Healy, supra note 87, at 153. 
483. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1354. 
484. See supra text accompanying note 347. 
485. See supra note 2. 
486. This approach was followed by the Federal Rules Decisions reporter for the 
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. See supra text accompanying notes 253-55. 
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can be read immediately and later researched conveniently and cited 
effectively. Should the court wish to comment on the new suggested 
rules, it should ensure that its request for briefs and arguments oper­
ates less as an "invitation" and more as a "command performance," so 
that all segments of the bar are before the court actively and certainly, 
rather than voting silently and, therefore, ambiguously.487 
C. Implementation 
The transition to the rules of civil procedure took eight years to 
complete, beginning with the Massachusetts Superior Court in 1974 
and ending with the Massachusetts Land Court in 1982.488 To some 
extent, this long period was due to the extensive coordination required 
to transform the entirety of civil litigation, from complaint to execu­
tion, to a federal rules model. 
However, the implementation of a federal rules evidence code 
should be easier, since it deals primarily only with trial rather than 
pre-trial or post-trial stages of a case. While there may have to be a 
transitional rule similar to the one used for the Massachusetts Supe­
rior Court in 1974,489 there should be a single effective date mandated 
for all courts of the commonwealth, thus requiring all participants in 
both civil and criminal cases to adapt to the new rules quickly.490 
There should be scheduled seminars for judges,491 court clerks, and 
lawyers who may not be acquainted with the federal rules model to 
learn the structure and content of the rules.492 To cushion the initial 
impact of the new code, the effective date should be during the sum­
mer months, when judges, lawyers, and clerks may have a better op­
portunity to become familiar with it. 493 
487. This concern was noted ten years ago, when the Boston Bar Association's Civil 
Procedure Committee became the Association's de facto commenting body on the Pro­
posed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence even though that committee had little expertise in 
those rules that would affect criminal matters. See BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 5. 
488. See 1973 Mass. Acts 1114, supra note 481; Hennessey, supra note 98, at 7. 
489. See MASS. R. CIV. P. lA ("Transitional Rule for Litigation in Progress on July 
1, 1974"). 
490. Healy, supra note 87, at 153. 
491. See Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 186. When a state code is enacted, and· even 
when it is just being discussed, the evidence awareness and educational interest of bench 
and bar rises. See id. at 186-87 n.53. 
492. In the fall of 1982, the author participated as a speaker in an orientation pro­
gram on the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence. Many of the attorneys at the 
program attended because they were not conversant with the federal-rules model. Most of 
them expressed their satisfaction with the rationality and usability of the rules. Cf. 
Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 193-94 (noting that opponents of codification viewed the fed­
eral rules as more complicated than they have proved to be). 
493. Healy, supra note 87, at 153. 
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D. Interpretation 
The year after the adoption of the federal-model rules of proce­
dure for the Massachusetts Superior Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court decided Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. v. Superior 
Court .494 In Rollins, the court stated: "This court having adopted 
comprehensive rules of civil procedure in substantially the same form 
as the earlier Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the adjudged construc­
tion theretofore given to the Federal Rules is to be given to our rules, 
absent compelling reasons to the contrary or significant differences in 
content."49S 
Other states codifying their evidence laws on a federal rules 
model have Rollins-like decisions on interpreting the new state 
code.496 If the new Massachusetts code is promulgated by the judici­
ary rather than passed by the legislature, there seems to be no reason 
why the Supreme Judicial Court could not accelerate the Rollins-like 
approach to interpretation by including Rollins-like language in the 
order of promulgation itself. 
E. Supplementation 
Commentators decry the absence of a continuing advisory com­
mittee on the Federal Rules of Evidence to monitor interpretation of 
the code and offer suggested supplementation.497 There is a current 
effort to petition the United States Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Conference of the United States to create such a continuing commit­
tee,498 and several commentators have recommended a state-level 
committee for codifying states.499 A continuing committee,sao perhaps 
comprised as suggested above, would make sense for Massachusetts, 
particularly during the "break-in" period after the codification and 
legislative coordination become effective, since no statutory "clean­
494. 330 N.E.2d S14 (Mass. 1975). 
495. [d. at S18. 
496. See. e.g., Laske v. State, 694 P.2d 536, 53S (Okla. erim. App. 1985) ("Since the 
[Oklahoma] Evidence Code was patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence with the 
intent that practice in both state and federal courts be uniform, it is useful to look to federal 
interpretations."). See also Whinery, supra note 234, at 244-46. 
497. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 234, at 277. 
498. See Letter from 75 law professors to Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Judge 
Robert E. Keeton, Judge William T. Hodges, and Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr. (Feb. 11, 1992) 
(on file with author). 
499. See Tollison, supra note 234, at 65-66; Whinery, supra note 234, at 257-5S. An 
unanswered, and usually unasked, question is how the state-level committees would be 
funded. See Tollison, supra note 234, at 66 n.90. 
500. See supra text accompanying note 347. 
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up," however well-coordinated, can be flawless. 501 
F. Reality 
The rapid acceptance of the Federal Rules of Evidence stands in 
sharp contrast to the fate of earlier codes.s02 The reason for this is not 
that the federal model is inherently a better code, nor that earlier ef­
forts were scuttled unfairly, nor that the attitudes of the practicing bar 
have changed dramatically. The federal rules were enacted because 
the federal jUdiciary received them with "open arms, not a 'show-me 
why' attitude."s03 While codification of evidence law may make sense 
for Massachusetts, it probably will actually occur only if those in­
volved in the litigation process, both from the bench and the bar, em­
brace a second codification effort actively and enthusiastically. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The effort between 1976 and 1982 to codify evidence law through 
the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence was unsuccessful, 
partly because of the content of the code itself and partly because of 
the reluctance of a majority of the Supreme Judicial Court to adopt 
that or any other code. Given the widespread adoption of federal­
model codifications during the intervening decade, codification for the 
commonwealth is now appropriate for reasons of uniformity, rational­
ity and modernity, competency and accessibility, and certainty and 
flexibility. It is hoped that the current judiciary, legislature, and bar 
will appreciate these reasons and join together in bringing the benefits 
of codification to Massachusetts evidence law. 
501. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1360. 
502. Patrick, supra note 234, at 672. 
503. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 183-84. 
